CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 June 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Roberto García Moritán (Argentina)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 623rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In keeping with the timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference will hold today, at the end of this plenary meeting, an informal meeting on substantive issues under item 3 of the agenda of the Conference, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Also today, at 12.30 p.m., the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will meet in room V with this same team of interpreters.

On the list of speakers for today are representatives of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Mongolia, Poland and Australia. I now call on the first speaker on the list, the representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Králik.

Mr. KRALIK (Czechoslovakia): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you every success in carrying out this responsible task, which, I am sure, will be in good hands. You can count on the cooperation of my delegation. Let me use this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Semichi, the representative of Algeria, for his important contribution during the first weeks of the second part of this 1992 session. I also wish to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Tanaka from Japan and Ambassador Sir Michael Weston from the United Kingdom.

Today I am going to start with the item which is at the top of our agenda. In our lengthy negotiations directed towards a comprehensive and total ban of chemical weapons, it has become increasingly apparent, especially during the last year, that time is moving fast and there are unresolved questions still to be dealt with. I should like to begin by saying that we are coming close to the completion of many years of effort toward achieving a global ban on chemical weapons. We must not let such an opportunity pass us by. World public opinion is watching us with great interest. Accommodating moves in the area of verification, the crystallization of legal and technical aspects of the convention, as well as attractive, far-reaching offers of a site for the future international organization for the ban on chemical weapons, have had a wide response and support among the delegations, including my own. Working paper WP.400 is not only a basis for further negotiations; it is also a model for possible final compromise. Therefore the approach of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and his team is welcomed and enjoys our full support. There is no longer much time left for reiterating well-known national positions. The political willingness expressed by practically all the participants in these negotiations should take shape in an acceptable compromise. Certainly nobody expects to be 100 per cent satisfied with everything and so a logical modus operandi should do away with any insistence on details which is often quite unnecessary. I know that some of them are extremely important, but perhaps we should be more

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concerned with creating the whole mosaic and not just with the sum of its parts, even if they may be perfect little stones. Sometimes I wonder if this enormous effort does not grow out of a fear that something has been forgotten or that one aspect has been overlooked in the text of the convention. What then? Will it be possible to correct it in the future? Will annual or other conferences of the States parties be able to reach an appropriate solution? I do hope that any kind of parallel with some review conferences which did not come up to expectations will not apply. In this case, the appropriately worded article XV in WP.400 on amendments and changes would have no sense. I have not the slightest doubt that in cases of need and given vigorous developments in the field of chemistry, the member States will certainly be able to make adequate general adjustments according to need and in the spirit and letter of the convention.

I would like to make a few brief remarks on some of the unresolved questions. Efforts to find an acceptable composition of the executive council must be crowned by a pragmatic formulation. Equitable geographical distribution certainly does not mean an equal number of seats, as in option 1. This is not at all in keeping with the understanding of geographical distribution which has traditionally operated within the United Nations framework. I am of the opinion that the executive body of the future organization can be most effective and flexible in decision-making and in finding correct solutions only if it is not of a discriminatory nature. The right of every country to take part in its activities with due respect to specific criteria, including that of industrial development, is appropriately reflected in option 2, that is, the distribution of seats within the framework of the traditional five United Nations groups. Variability, or rather, supplementation, is possible, but the basic framework according to United Nations structures, should be maintained. I have also welcomed the suggestion that the executive council would to some degree be involved in resolving such delicate questions like the timetable for the destruction of chemical weapons arsenals and the possible conversion of CW production facilities. This problem should be considered from every aspect with full awareness not only of the existing difficulties, but also of the capacities and experiences which future States parties to the chemical weapons convention have at their disposal and which they are willing to make available in order to find a comprehensive solution. Article XI is an indivisible part of the convention and therefore harmonizing it with the rest of the text as a whole must be based on an acceptable compromise. The unrestricted transfer of controlled chemical substances would be in conflict with the priority aims of the convention, with the banning and elimination of chemical weapons. Free access to chemical substances, while maintaining the basic rule of controlling the proliferation of means for the production or development of chemical agents, should be in the form of an enticement and as a logical reward for adhering to the convention. The financial application with the realization of the CWC should be at least partially balanced in just this way. The last area which WP.400 does not deal with is the headquarters of the future organization. All three candidates have their advantages and disadvantages. Many of us recently had a chance to judge this. I would like to use this occasion to

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also thank the representatives of Austria and the Netherlands who were our hosts in Vienna and The Hague. No matter what the final decision will be, I believe that both these cities, along with Geneva, will remain always in favour of a ban on chemical weapons. As far as the seat of the future organization is concerned, I am honoured to declare that I have recently informed the newly elected President Klestil of Austria that unofficial support for Vienna has now become the official position of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

I would like to use this opportunity to put forward one procedural suggestion. It cannot be ruled out that our Conference will not be able to decide on the headquarters site by consensus from the very beginning. In the event that there would be some kind of a decision-making process (we could call it a vote), then I would urge that the winner of the secret ballotting - and I leave the detailed procedure up to Ambassador Kamal - would be accepted as the compromise solution by consensus. But this is just an idea which I submit for your consideration. The other CWC problems are in the negotiation stage and so I will not reiterate our national standpoint.

Just briefly on the other points on the agenda. I am delighted by the announcement of France that it will take part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. This is an example of a new approach to the substance of the matter and it will surely have very positive implications for further developments in this exceptionally important and closely followed question. I do hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be established soon. In the same breath, I would like to add that I foresee a close relationship between the complex solution of questions connected with nuclear testing and negative security assurances. As last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NSA, I believe that because of improved international conditions, the time is ripe now for this anticipated shift. After the completion of the chemical weapons convention, in which I firmly believe, the problems of outer space will then come to the fore. All that is needed to make this happen are those measures of mutual trust and a beginning of the same cooperation which I have witnessed during the last few months in the question of transparency in armaments.

We have been talking for a long time about the need to reorganize the agenda of the Conference. The negotiating Decalogue, which was handed down to us by the first United Nations special session on disarmament, corresponds to the period in which it emerged. But more recently, we have witnessed tremendous changes which call for flexibility on the part of the Conference on Disarmament. The fact that the Conference adopted a new negotiation item, "Transparency in armaments", shows that it is able to respond to the present challenge. Personally, I am very glad that, particularly in this very important area, we have achieved a psychological breakthrough. I am convinced that the other questions, like the problem of non-proliferation, regional security- and confidence-building and -making measures, regional disarmament, etc., will also find their proper place in the agenda of the Conference.

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The saying goes that we are wiser when we leave than we were when we arrived. Since I am finishing my assignment in Geneva, I would like to share with you what I have learned during the two years in this forum. First of all, I have been once again convinced about the deep philosophical truth of Goethe's observation that the most precious trait of human character is the ability to conceive the whole truth of a reality. And indeed, in this forum those proposals that stood the greatest chance of being accepted were not those directed to some specific problem, but on the contrary, those which saw reality as a whole. In these cases, the lofty intellectual, political will of individual delegations, fortified by a willingness to assume responsibility for a concept and an ideal, could very soon and without opposition result in a mutually advantageous consensus around those points in the negotiations which were, and are, conducive to building a world where everyone is strong "not with the strength of arms, but with the strength of moral principles", which is what is most important. Wherever the process of creating a peaceful infrastructure was linked to the process of building an institution, our negotiating forum assumed responsibility of historic dimensions and with a categorical charge: to strive together so that the outcome of the negotiations of this forum are distinguished by the concept of clarity and structural strength, as well as by the power of the loftiest humanitarian principles. Thus this forum too has revealed the truth of Jan Amos Comenius' teaching that "The power of truth, armed with the light of knowledge, becomes invincible."

In the light of what I have just said, permit me in conclusion to express my deep conviction that the Conference on Disarmament will succeed and continue to promote this courageous and noble thought that will sustain those ideals which are so essential for the future of the world. But of course this will be only when we - along with Pericles - are able to say of each one of us who comes or goes: "But the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet, notwithstanding, go out to meet it."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. Ambassador Králik has just made his last statement in the Conference plenary. His words will remain with us. I am sure that all the members of the Conference join me in expressing our appreciation for the enthusiasm, dedication and skill with which he discharged his funcions as representative of his country in our Conference. In a little over two years with us, Ambassador Králik distinguished himself as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances last year and by his tireless efforts representing his country's interests. He can be proud of the work he has accomplished. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish Ambassador and Mrs. Králik all the best in their future activities.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As this is the first time for me to address the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to thank all the members of the Conference for the warm words of welcome I have received on taking up my duties here as leader of the United Kingdom delegation. On behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf, allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the present period. It is a pleasure to see two distinguished members of the Argentine diplomatic service together on the podium as our President and Secretary-General. Argentina is a country with which the United Kingdom's close and traditional ties are happily, once again, firmly knotted. I should also like to thank Ambassador Semichi of Algeria for the way he conducted his presidency in the preceding period, involving, as it did, travel to both The Hague and Vienna, in both of which places he made numerous speeches with great charm on behalf of all of us who accompanied him. His was a particularly energetic stewardship. My delegation wishes to add its own welcome to those already offered to my fellow newcomer, Ambassador Tanaka of Japan. I have already seen enough of him to know how fortunate we are to have him with us. Lastly, I should like to offer my delegation's best wishes to Ambassador Králik on the occasion of his departure. We have listened with rapt attention to the wise advice he has given us this morning.

Until August 1990, I had, frankly, given little thought to chemical weapons, beyond entertaining a half-baked idea that knock-out drops might one day be developed as the ultimate, humane weapon. Then Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, some of them wearing protective masks. Many of us there recalled the horrifying pictures we had seen of Iranian victims of Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons. Over the following months, as we listened to BBC reports of NBC suits being issued to the coalition forces and civilians in neighbouring countries, the thoughts of those of us stranded in Kuwait turned frequently to chemical weapons and the possibility that we would find ourselves the helpless victims of a chemical attack. Fortunately, such an attack never materialized.

When I was posted here to Geneva, it was, therefore, with all the zeal of the convert that I approached the subject of the chemical weapons convention. I have been greatly impressed, and I confess surprised, by the serious and hard-headed way in which the negotiations on the CWC are now being pursued. I should like to pay tribute to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, for the way in which, with a combination of whip-cracking determination, skilful diplomacy and gentle humour, he is leading us towards the conclusion of the convention. There is now a genuine and widely shared desire to secure the best treaty we can this year, and a realization that this is preferable to continuing to strive for a probably unattainable ideal. My Government certainly shares this desire.

I take this opportunity to thank Ambassador von Wagner for his efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to him by numerous delegations who spoke in response to the "model" convention introduced by the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, on 19 March. The Australian draft, by showing

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how close we were to a complete treaty text, provided a valuable spur to our work. Subsequently, working paper 400, presented by Ambassador von Wagner on 18 May, has taken us further down the final straight towards the conclusion of the negotiations.

There are, of course, still a number of points to be decided. Crucial to the success of the CWC will be the degree of confidence States parties have in the compliance of others with the obligations which will have been commonly assumed. For this, the effectiveness of the verification provisions will be of key importance. The right for any State party to request a challenge inspection will represent a vital means for providing assurance about compliance, avoiding potentially damaging mistrust, and thus helping to ensure that the convention works and continues to work in the future. But this will only happen if the requesting State party has a clear guarantee of a prompt response to its concerns, in the form of an inspection and, where necessary, follow-up action by the executive council and/or the conference of States parties. As everyone here knows well, my Government could have accepted, indeed would have welcomed, a more rapid and intrusive form of challenge inspection than that which is set out in working paper 400. But this was not to be. We also wanted the challenging State party to have the mandatory right to send an observer with the inspection team. We still hope that a way can be found to make this proposal acceptable to all other delegations. The challenge regime that is now on offer provides fully for the protection of all legitimate security concerns. Any weakening of its provisions could seriously undermine a central pillar of the CWC as a security instrument.

The routine monitoring and inspection of chemical industry will also be an important element of the treaty to deter misuse of civilian plants and of industrially important chemicals. For deterrence to be effective, inspections must be widespread. To be cost-effective, they must also be well targeted. I believe that the compromise proposal put forward by Western Group delegations in working paper 398 offers a way of combining these two objectives in a simple, straightforward and non-discriminatory regime. I hope it will be given serious and positive consideration by other delegations and provide a way out of the current dilemma on the issue of "capability".

Effective verification will provide a solid foundation for the convention. In time, it is to be hoped, it will reduce and perhaps even render unnecessary other security measures such as export controls.

When we are taking such pains to create this solid foundation, we must also make sure that the edifice is sound. The definition of a chemical weapon must be clear and unambiguous; any exceptions must be clearly defined and spelt out to avoid circumvention of the treaty. Uses not prohibited under the convention include those relating to law enforcement and riot control. But if chemicals used for these purposes were entirely outside the purview of the convention, it would in the view of my Government be seriously weakened. It

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would not be known whether such chemicals were of a type consistent with these purposes. We believe that the wisest course is to limit the type of chemicals permitted, preferably by a list, or if that cannot be agreed, by specifying the types of chemicals that may be used. A requirement for declarations of chemicals to be used for law enforcement and riot control purposes would provide for the necessary transparency and confidence-buidling.

Another outstanding problem concerns old and abandoned CW. In the view of my Government, it is sensible to envisage some relaxation of the more stringent destruction requirements in the case of very old CW which the technical secretariat deems have deteriorated to the extent of being of no military use. But there must be a clear obligation for destruction of abandoned CW which may still have military potential.

The destruction of all CW within a prescribed period has always been a basic tenet of the convention. We are keen to retain this. If, as now appears to be the case, one major possessor foresees difficulty in meeting the 10-year destruction timetable which is set out in the draft convention, this problem will need to be tackled on the basis of specific proposals. But the obligation for destruction must remain.

One of the other major unresolved issues concerns the composition of the executive council. My Government attaches great weight to having an efficient and fully representative body to oversee the operation of this important convention. On the basis of the consultations which have been conducted by Ambassador Tóth in recent days, we believe that a solution to this problem can be found. It will also be important, in recruiting the staff of the technical secretariat, which will be responsible for the day-to-day operation of the convention, that the primary consideration should be the efficiency and effectiveness of the technical secretariat, with of course due regard being paid also to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

Before turning to other aspects of the work of this Conference, I should like formally to announce that, having studied the varius offers put forward by countries willing to host the seat of the organization, my Government has decided to support the Dutch bid. We were helped in arriving at our decision by the excellent paper presented by Ambassador Kamal. We were also helped by the visits to The Hague and Vienna, generously arranged by the Dutch and Austrian Governments respectively. We are confident that The Hague will be an efficient host for the organization. We hope that an early decision will now be reached, by consensus, on this issue, so that work can start on preparing for the implementation of the convention as soon as enough States have signed it, as I hope they will before the end of this year. I would note here the generous offer of the French Government to host a signing ceremony.

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My main objective today has been to put forward some thoughts on the chemical weapons negotiations. For the present, as we are all agreed, these must be the major preoccupation of the Conference. However, as a newcomer, I cannot let this opportunity pass without also casting a brief eye over the rest of our agenda. I find a striking contrast. In the case of chemical weapons, we are working hard and, in terms of the complexities of the subject and the broad composition of this Conference, effectively. We have a clear objective and a clear time-scale which we are collectively determined to meet. On other subjects, however, we seem to be totally stalled and to have no real common objective beyond lecturing each other.

The Conference has as its primary document the so-called "decalogue", bequeathed to us by the first special sesson on disarmament in 1978. This is a reasonably comprehensive list of matters requiring attention if arms control and disarmament are to be pursued on all fronts. However, although the decalogue has pride of place at the beginning of our report, every year we adopt a working agenda which seems to be perversely selected from those areas of the decalogue where no consensus for multilateral action has proved possible - apart, of course, from chemical weapons. This is due both to the nature of the subjects themselves and to the appropriateness of the Conference as a forum for taking them forward.

My Government is committed to a comprehensive nuclear test ban as a long-term objective. However, as we have frequently stated here, so long as nuclear weapons contribute positively to global security, and the United Kingdom's own nuclear weapons contribute positively to our security and that of our allies, we foresee a need to test, from time to time, to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe and effective. Under these circumstances, the role of the Conference on this question can in our view only be as a forum for the exchange of views on the necessary practical means for establishing the test ban when the time becomes ripe for its implementation. We are happy to contribute to work on this basis. We also support, for the same reason, the continuing work of the Group of Scientific Experts, whose second technical test has been an important feature of the past 12 months.

The very titles of items 2 and 3 of our agenda - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race" and "Prevention of nuclear war" - are redolent of the cold war. Fortunately, this is now behind us. There have in fact been dramatic developments in the area of nuclear disarmament over the last two or three years and particularly in the last 12 months. But these have very largely resulted from negotiations and developments in the relationship between the United States and the former Soviet Union. My own country has also made a significant contribution. But the role of the Conference in this area also, by the nature of the problem, is for the time being confined to ensuring that all concerned are aware of each other's views with regard to the practicability of further reductions. This is why we prefer to keep this subject for discussion in plenary meetings rather than through an Ad Hoc Committee. I shall be speaking further about these agenda items on behalf of the Western Group next week.

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The question of negative security assurances is important to many States. It has been possible to make considerable strides in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty and of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Progress in this area is likely to result from negotiations between the nuclear-weapon States in the first instance and is likely to continue to be related to the treaties I have mentioned.

In the case of outer space, important treaties already exist. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 bans nuclear explosions in various environments, including outer space for whatever purpose. The Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in that environment. These are vitally important. But there is no consensus at present for further legal restraints in this area, although we all wish to avoid an "arms race" in outer space. There is no doubt that most current military activities in that environment are of a stabilizing and defensive nature. In particular, outer space has played an important role in the development of transparency in military affairs and is vital for military communications. Important new doctrines involving the development of systems to provide defence against long-range ballistic missiles will also need to mature further before any new legal regime is likely to be possible.

It would be perfectly possible for the Conference to conclude a treaty banning classical radiological weapons tomorrow if this were the general wish. However, it also has to be acknowledged that radiological weapons are not a real military threat, since the inherent problems in their development, production and use outweigh any possible military utility. And in the view of my Government the question of constraints on attacks on nuclear installations is properly a matter relating to the laws of war.

The item "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" is currently in abeyance. My Government has no interest in reviving work on this question. We believe that meaningful disarmament in the context of enhanced security for all States is achieved step by step, taking account of the current political situation. Long-term road maps can have no precision by their very nature and thus give little return for the time and resources expended in their development.

We now of course have a new item, "Transparency in armaments". This is a very challenging subject, since its scope covers all aspects of transparency relating to destabilizing accumulations of armaments, both conventional and unconventional. It remains to be seen whether the Conference can find ways to develop worthwhile legal instruments in this area.

From the foregoing, I conclude that our first task once the CW negotiations are concluded will be to overhaul our agenda and try to put the Conference into a position where it can make concrete contributions in the

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field of arms control and disarmament as we approach the end of the millenium. At the same time, we shall need to settle the future composition of the Conference. My Government recognizes the frustration caused to States who have long indicated their wish to participate directly in our work. We also recognize that the world has changed dramatically since the decision was taken in 1983 - but not yet implemented - to extend the Conference's membership by four States. However the membership of the United Nations is changing by the month. Leaving this matter for resolution early next year may therefore mean that we can approach it against a more stable background and make decisions which will remain valid for a reasonable period thereafter.

But first we need to conclude the CWC. When, several weeks ago, I first thought about what I should say on the occasion of my first statement in plenary, I intended to say something about the dire consequences, both for this Conference and for the world, of our failure to conclude a convention this year. Happily, however, it has become clear during recent weeks that the possibility of failure no longer exists. The only question is how good a convention it will be. For our part, we are determined that it shall be the best that can be achieved in the remaining weeks available to us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I am pleased that his first statement to the Conference on Disarmament should have been made with Argentina in the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Yumjav.

Mr. YUMJAV (Mongolia): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are convinced that your wide diplomatic experience, your deep insight and your high competence will help to ensure the success of our work. I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, for the effective guidance of our deliberations in the Conference during his presidency. Taking this opportunity I sincerely welcome our new colleagues, Ambassadors Tanaka and Michael Weston, and wish them every success in their noble endeavours. My delegation has learned with heartfelt regret and great reluctance that our distinguished colleague Ambassador Králik will be leaving us soon. Let me also, however, take this opportunity to extend to Ambassador Králik our deep appreciation for his excellent contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and wish him good health, happiness and success in his future activities.

The present session of the Conference on Disarmament is taking place at a very remarkable period of history. The dramatic achievements in the last few years, in particular the end of the cold war, have opened up unprecedented opportunities for the international community to bring about promising results

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in the field of disarmament. We are encouraged by reaching such significant agreements as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the START Treaty. The Presidents of the United States of America and Russia have announced radical cuts in their strategic nuclear weapons. These important unilateral initiatives, in our view, will impart a new impulse to the efforts to achieve further reductions in their nuclear arsenals and contribute to greater stability throughout the world. My delegation welcomes the signing of the Protocol to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, on 23 May this year, in Lisbon.

My delegation also welcomes the various initiatives taken by several countries in Latin America, namely the Cartagena Declaration on Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Mendoza Agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the agreement between Brazil and Argentina for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Mongolia, as an Asian country, attaches great importance to strengthening mutual understanding and trust in Asia. Therefore, we highly commend the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The Mongolian delegation fully shares the view that the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons constitutes one of the most burning security issues of today. My delegation is convinced that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the pillar of the present non-proliferation system. For that reason, we fully support the universality of the NPT. It is gratifying to note that China and France, as well certain non-nuclear States, have recently acceded to the Treaty. Mongolia, like many other countries, advocates the unlimited extension of the NPT at the next review conference in 1995.

At the current session of the CD some delegations have put forward interesting proposals for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. In this regard, the call by Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, to the Security Council for sanctions to be imposed on any State party breaching the provisions of the NPT, deserves our full support.

We have a clear mandate from the United Nations General Assembly concerning the nuclear test ban. General Assembly resolution 46/29 reaffirmed the particular responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and in this context urged the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1992. The above-mentioned resolution also requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, taking into account all relevant proposals and future initiatives. Therefore,

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my delegation feels that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established as soon as possible. It is encouraging to note, moreover, that this year yet another nuclear-weapon State will participate in the work of that Committee.

The Mongolian delegation welcomes the decision of France to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons for 1992, regarding it as an important contribution to nuclear disarmament. It is our hope that other nuclear Powers will follow suit.

We note with satisfaction that the question of "Transparency in armaments" has been included in the agenda of the Conference. In this connection, I cannot but stress the significance of the universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms which was established at United Nations Headquarters at the beginning of this year. It is our wish that all Member States, including the world's major arms suppliers, will provide the United Nations with data in accordance with the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L.

The negotiations on a chemical weapons convention have entered a final and decisive stage. The successful conclusion of a convention this year will not only prove the efficacy of our Conference but will also be a landmark in the history of disarmament. Mongolia supports the convening of a ministerial meeting this fall with a view to resolving outstanding political problems in the draft convention. We welcome the offer made by France to hold a signature conference for the chemical weapons convention in Paris before the end of the year. Such a representative gathering of dignitaries, in our opinion, will undoubtedly contribute to ensuring the universality of the future convention. My delegation welcomes the decision of the Russian Federation to assume responsibility for the elimination of all chemical weapons of the former USSR.

The Government of Mongolia highly commends Australian efforts aimed at speeding up the process of negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. The compromise draft convention submitted by Australia no doubt gave impetus to expediting discussions on various aspects of the convention. My delegation deeply appreciates the excellent contribution made by Ambassador Adolf von Wagner, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the bureau and the German delegation in preparing working paper CD/CW/WP.400. We are convinced that this well-structured document, serving as a good basis for further negotiations, will meet our common aspirations to finalize the convention this year.

It is encouraging to note that in recent weeks negotiations have intensified on such complicated and unresolved questions as verification, the executive council and old and abandoned chemical weapons. It is well known that in the future convention challenge inspection is the core of verification. My delegation, like most others, subscribes to the opinion that the warning time for inspections should be kept short and that challenge proceedings should be kept simple. In addition, these procedures should match the interests of the challenged and requesting States parties. We have no

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objection to supporting the idea of observer participation in the inspection team. It is for this reason that my delegation supported the concept of graduated, managed access to challenged sites, contained in document CD/CW/WP.352, submitted last year by the delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia.

We are of the opinion that verification in chemical industries should be balanced. In this connection, my delegation expresses its profound thanks to the Swiss delegation for organizing, at the end of January in Basel, with the participation of Swiss chemical industries, a most useful symposium on chemical industry and disarmament.

As far as the composition of the executive council is concerned, I appreciate very much the efforts of Ambassador Tóth to reach acceptable solutions. In our view, the executive council should be based essentially on equitable geographical criteria, while also taking into account industrial criteria. It is also advisable to bear in mind the experience of United Nations agencies for allocating the seats of their executive bodies, in particular of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors. My delegation is against the excessive expansion of the overall size of the executive council's numbers. We have no objection to the improvement of the last options of Ambassador Tóth, based on geographical criteria, giving due consideration to small States' interests as well.

In the opinion of our delegation, the question of personnel representation of the technical secretariat is also of importance. In this regard, I wish to express my delegation's gratitude to the Government of Finland for training prospective inspectors from developing countries. I would also like to welcome similar initiatives announced by the Netherlands, Germany and Norway. Such efforts will no doubt contribute to equitable representation in the inspectorate of the technical secretariat.

My delegation sincerely welcomes the offers by Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland to host the future organization for the chemical weapons convention and appreciates the efforts that they have made to provide the most favourable conditions for the future organization's functioning. My special thanks also to the delegations of Austria and the Netherlands for the generous hospitality extended to us during our visit to Vienna and The Hague. Concerning the site of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Mongolian authorities have come to the conclusion that The Hague should serve as the most appropriate one.

Mongolia, which possesses no chemical weapons, shares the view that the future convention will become universal and effective so long as it contains clearly expressed provisions for automatic assistance to States parties endangered by the use of chemical weapons irrespective of all other considerations.

Before concluding, I would like to confirm again our wish that Mongolia will become an original signatory to the convention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Gizowski.

Mr. GIZOWSKI (Poland): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am sure that you will again demonstrate your well-known diplomatic skill in discharging your responsible duties. I wish you every success and pledge my delegation's full support and cooperation. My congratulations also go to your predecessor in the chair, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, for skilfully guiding us during the preceding term. We listened with great interest to the farewell statement of Ambassador Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, our good and close neighbour not only in Europe but in Geneva as well. We regret his intending departure and would like to express our appreciation of his important contributions to the work of the Conference. We wish him every success and would like to assure him that we will miss him and particularly his great sense of humour he has shown so often. My delegation extends a warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Tanaka of Japan and Ambassador Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom. We look forward to working closely with each of you.

I will be brief. As we are coming closer to the completion of our negotiations of the chemical weapons convention, a number of decisions should be made on the few remaining issues. One of them is the question of the future seat of the organization. My delegation greatly appreciates the efforts of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan to facilitate the decision-making process. We are grateful to the candidates and would like to commend them on the detailed manner in which they have presented the advantages of their respective offers and for their fair and sincere competition for the seat of headquarters. It is appropriate also to express our gratitude for the opportunity provided to us to get acquainted with the proposed candidates on-site. I am taking the floor today to announce that after careful analysis my Government has decided to support The Hague for the seat of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador O'Sullivan.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, may I join the others who have spoken this morning in saying how pleased we are to see you in the Chair of our Conference, you who are a friend to all of us and whose skills are admired by all of us? May I also take the opportunity of saying, on behalf of my delegation, to the Algerian delegation, our thanks for the exemplary way in which Ambassador Semichi presided over us last month?

I would like to comment on two issues this morning, and with the words of Pericles ringing in my ears, I trust I am venturing on to glory, not on to disaster. I want to first of all express the regret of the Australian Government that it has not proved possible so far to establish a committee

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

on banning the testing of nuclear weapons. The impasse in this Conference, however, is not matched by a similar stasis in the real world. I note, for instance, that there is a very important decision by President Mitterrand to have a moratorium on French nuclear testing for this year, one which we, Australia, greatly welcome and we think is of great significance. Recently, there has been a major statement of importance by the Prime Minister of Canada. There has been press speculation, which I understand is well founded, about a whole series of ideas taking place within the United States national security bureaucracy about ideas for limiting - perhaps even banning - testing. And, of course, going in the opposite direction, we have had a recent and massive Chinese test. So things are going on in the real world while we, unfortunately, are not considering them here. There are real questions being raised about what use nuclear weapons now have in the sort of world we have moved into. Is there a need to test them? Can their safety be assured by means other than testing them? These are questions that we think ought to be debated here, and we want to record our frustration and our disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament so far has proved unable to establish a committee to do that. So, we look forward to some changes.

Secondly, I want to comment on another matter that has also been raised by several other speakers this morning. The Australian Government, like others, has been looking closely at the question of the selection of the site for the organization for the prevention of chemical weapons. We have had the advantage of three excellent bids and all sites, in our view, would be very competent hosts and well able to deal with the requirements of the organization for the prevention of chemical weapons. In weighing up the factors to reach a preference, we have tried to take careful account of economic, political, infrastructural, industrial and scientific elements. Obviously, in such a complex equation, there is not an absolute choice but, on balance, our preference is for The Hague.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his statement, as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Cuba, Mrs. Bauta Solés.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): My delegation has already had the opportunity to congratulate you on taking up your duties as President of this Conference, but it is always a pleasure to reiterate our satisfaction at seeing you presiding over our work. Also to reiterate our gratitude to the delegation of Algeria for its work in the same post during the previous month.

I have received instructions from the Government of Cuba to thank the respective Governments of the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria formally on this occasion for the balanced and generous bids they have tendered to this Conference in connection with the headquarters of the future chemical weapons organization. My capital has devoted careful attention to this offer. We should also like to express our special gratitude for the generous hospitality

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

we enjoyed in the cities of The Hague and Vienna during our recent visits to the two cities. The Government of Cuba has decided to lend its support to the city of Vienna in its aspiration to host the future chemical weapons organization. It also hopes that a decision on this subject will be a consensus decision of the Conference on Disarmament.

I do not wish to conclude without joining those who have thanked Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan this morning for the work he has been doing in connection with the consultations being held on the subject.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement and once again for her kind words. I have no further speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor this morning? The distinguished delegation of Chile has asked for the floor. Mr. Raimundo González, you have the floor.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, and on behalf of my Government, I would like to congratulate you most sincerely and expressly on attaining such an important position within the Conference on Disarmament, a post to which we attach the greatest importance and one which we believe in your hands offers real possibilities of moving towards essentially productive purposes. Hence - we would like this to be clear - the satisfaction of the Chilean Government at seeing you guiding this session of the Conference.

My delegation did not intend to take part in the debate in this plenary. However, we believe that the statements we have heard this morning give rise to a number of interesting ideas and in this sense we believe that the distinguished Ambassador of Australia has shed some light which we deem particularly important, and a few questions remain which it would be a good idea for us to be able to consider subsequently. I am specifically referring to the nuclear item, the item on nuclear testing and everything related to this important matter. He spoke to us of the differences or discrepancies between what is debated in the Conference on Disarmament, or rather the lack of intent and political will to debate items which are on the agenda, and what is happening in the real world. That real world also includes Latin America. Latin America, we believe without boasting, is giving a very specific example in terms of the establishment of clear parameters on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Your own country, Mr. President, and Brazil have signed an important declaration on this matter. My country, along with Argentina and Brazil, is carrying out important negotiations in terms of applying the Treaty of Tlatelolco if matters so indicate. I would say that there is a very tangible, very clear and very determined political will in different areas of the world on the nuclear issue which this Conference cannot afford the luxury of evading. Hence in this sense we would like to endorse fully the concerns put forward to us so clearly this morning by the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, and we cannot fail to do so bearing in mind the background which, in the case of Latin America, represents keen concern on such a crucial subject.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I will now turn to another matter. Today, as always, the secretariat has circulated the timetable of meetings that the Conference and its subsidiary bodies will be holding during the coming week. As is customary, the timetable is indicative in nature and can be amended if necessary. I recognize the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Before commenting on the subject you have tabled, Mr. President, I should like first of all to express my regret that my neighbour Ambassador Králik, the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia and its representative in the Conference on Disarmament, will shortly be leaving us. I pay tribute to Ambassador Králik for his human warmth, for the good-neighbourly relations linking Egypt and Czechoslovakia in this hall, and for his positive contribution to the deliberations in this Conference and to the various discussions in which I have taken part, in both official and unofficial meetings held in Geneva outside this Conference. I would therefore like to express my sincere appreciation and warmest gratitude to him, and would particularly like to mention his hosting of informal meetings in the Czechoslovakia mission on economic and social reform in the United Nations system and his positive contribution on this key issue. I am sorry to see him leaving Geneva, and on behalf of Egypt and my colleagues I should like to convey to him our sincere wishes for success, health and happiness.

Regarding the timetable of meetings from 8 to 12 June 1992, I have several comments to make. The first concerns transparency in armaments. Time permitting, I have always been willing to hold informal meetings in the Conference this week, and I have informed the secretariat of the Conference accordingly. It appears, however, that this was impossible because several meetings have been scheduled this week, which I fully understand. This is a very important question and the various delegations attach a great deal of importance to it. We spent a good deal of time seeking consensus on the inclusion of this item on the agenda of the Conference, as decided at the Conference meeting on 26 May 1992. I was therefore concerned to ensure that such meetings were held soon so as to complete discussions on this important item as soon as possible.

As for the proposed timetable, there are two meetings; the first is on Tuesday, 9 June, at 10 a.m., to which I have no objection. Nor do I object to any meeting being held at any time, provided it does not clash with my commitments to attend other meetings in Geneva. The second meeting has been scheduled for Thursday, 11 June, at 3 p.m. I regret, Sir, that the Feast of the Holy Sacrifice, which is one of the most important Muslim feast days, falls on 11 June, and I personally will be unable to work on that day whether or not the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is held then. I told Mr. Berasategui, the Secretary-General of the Conference, that I hoped we would not be having the plenary that day, nor any other meeting in which my country's delegation was to take part. Consequently, the day could have been moved to Wednesday, Tuesday or Friday. If the Conference does not adopt a

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

decision to move that day's meetings to the Tuesday, Wednesday or Friday, I will be unable to work, as observance of religious feasts is extremely important for Islam and for Muslims. I will not therefore be able to work on that day, and the Conference should decide to move the official meeting to Tuesday, Wednesday or Friday, but if it insists on holding it on that day, I simply shall not be in a position to take part. I shall therefore be unable to chair the informal meeting on transparency in armaments on that day; I am ready to chair it on any other day.

While I am on the subject, it should be said with regard to the decision we adopted on 26 May 1992 that the title of the agenda item as it appears in the Arabic translation should be amended; the Arabic version uses the word الشفافية (clarity) in referring to the question of armaments, whereas the word used should be الوضوح (transparency). This applies to document CD/1150 of 27 May 1992, and the same error is repeated in CD/1119/Add.1. The Arabic refers to "clarity" in armaments and "clarity" in arms, whereas the correct word to use is "transparency" in armaments. The same expression should be used in both documents. There are also many other errors in the Arabic version of the document which give rise to confusion and ambiguity. I shall correct them on behalf of the Arab delegations and hand them to the secretariat.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Zahran for his statement. We have taken due note of the efforts he is going to undertake in dealing with the new item on our agenda concerning transparency in armaments, and in that regard I thank him for drawing our attention to the need to modify the Arabic version on this matter; I believe the secretariat has taken due note of the request. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Mr. Tefiani.

Mr. TEFIANI (Algeria) (translated from Arabic): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to express the appreciation of my delegation at seeing you take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament this month. We are certain that your experience and competence will prove effective in the success of guaranteeing our work. I would also like, through you, to convey my country's thanks for the kind words expressed concerning my delegation. We are equally thankful for the cooperation shown during our presidency of the Conference. Last but not least, I would also like to associate my delegation with those that have wished His Excellency Ambassador Králik of Czechoslovakia success in his forthcoming activities.

We believe that the United Nations has no particular religion and belongs to no particular religious denomination. In this respect, meetings of the Conference on Disarmament have been cancelled in the past because of religious holidays, and last week's plenary was brought forward from Thursday to Tuesday because of Ascension Day. In addition, according to the timetable of meetings submitted for next week, 8 June will also be an official holiday because of Whitsun. We would therefore like to ask, as has already been agreed in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, that 11 June should be an official holiday to enable the Islamic delegations to celebrate the Feast of the Holy Sacrifice. I therefore wish to associate my delegation with what was said by Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I address the plenary under your presidency, may I express my own and my delegation's great pleasure at working under the wise stewardship of a colleague, and for his country, for whom we have so much admiration and friendship and affection and respect? On the substance of the intervention made by Ambassador Mounir Zahran with reference to next Thursday, 11 June, my delegation faces the same constraints, which occur, incidentally, just on two days every year. I urge all our colleagues to manifest their understanding and appreciation of the need for reprogramming all meetings scheduled for that Thursday, 11 June.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. Does any other deletgation wish to take the floor? The distinguished delegation of Iran has asked to speak.

Mr. TABATABOEE (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, allow me also to join the previous speakers in expressing my delegation's gratitude at seeing you preside over our deliberations. It will only suffice to add that my delegation also will be observing an important religious holiday on Thursday, 11 June and thus will be unable to attend any United Nations meetings, and therefore it would be very much appreciated if these meetings could be postponed and we call upon the Conference to take proper measures in this regard.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Iran for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. Is there any other delegation that wishes to take the floor? If not, I think one of the traditions of the Conference on Disarmament has been to accommodate the concerns and interests of the member States, especially when dealing with such undoubtedly special situations as that mentioned by Ambassador Zahran, Ambassador Kamal and our colleagues from Algeria and Iran. However, since this matter is something that is not for the Chair to settle alone, but has to be put before all of you, I would venture to consult the Conference on Disarmament on the request made by our colleagues for the cancellation of next Thursday's plenary meeting, bringing it forward to Tuesday. In consulting you I would like to share with you the reasons for which the timetable for next week contains provision for a meeting on Thursday 11th, and that seems to be the case because the United Nations official holidays are set by the Secretary-General of the Organization and, as we all know, vary depending on the customs of the host country. Generally speaking, the holidays correspond to national or religious holidays or other celebrations. As I remind you of this factor I would also like you to note that we have received a communication from an observer State in the Conference on Disarmament, the distinguished delegation of Norway, which has informed us of a visit by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of that country on Thursday 11th. Against this general

(The President)

background for your information, I would like to ask whether there is any objection to moving to Tuesday 9th the plenary meeting scheduled for Thursday 11th. The distinguished delegation of Australia has asked me for the floor - Ambassador O'Sullivan.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): There is a question now in my mind because of the comments that you just made about the visit of the Norwegian official. There has been a tradition here, as you said, of trying to accommodate different delegations' requirements, and I think that is a tradition we would like to see preserved, so I understand the difficulty of a number of delegations participating at meetings on Thursday of next week and I understand and fully respect those decisions, but if it is also the case that we are going to have a visit by the senior official from Norway, I have a question now in my mind about taking a decision to cancel a plenary, so before I participated in any decision, I would like to know what the status of that visit is - this is the first thing. Then, if it is still on, I would like to revisit this issue.

Mr. BERNHARDSEN (Norway): Mr. President, as this is the first time I speak in this forum, I would like to take the opportunity to congratulate you on your position as President of the Conference on Disarmament. Changing at this very late moment the date for the plenary would, of course, create a practical difficulty for us. I cannot say now whether it would be possible for our State Secretary in our Ministry of Foreign Affairs to change her plans - that we would have to refer to Oslo and I am not sure I could provide a quick answer; maybe after lunch I could. I would hope, since this is a suggestion which has come up only a week before, that we would be able to retain the meeting as planned - a plenary has been scheduled for many months now.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I recognize the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): With reference to the important intervention made by our colleague from Norway, I would just like to explain to him a fact perhaps that he is not aware of, which is that these two Muslim feasts, of which, as I said, there are only two in the year, are dependent on the lunar calendar and therefore their date cannot be fixed in advance, and the question, therefore, of advance programming is one which is beyond the competence of anybody. It just so happens that it is now that we know that the holiday will fall on Thursday, 11 June, and the request that is being made is to see whether our colleagues can somehow adjust their convenience in order to meet a requirement which would otherwise prevent us, or some of us, from listening to what would be, I am sure, a very important communication from the State Secretary of Norway.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, as this is the first time that I am taking the floor under your presidency, I wish to say how pleased we are at seeing you preside over our meeting. I come from a country, Nigeria, that has a sizeable number of Muslims. Naturally, my delegation is in sympathy with the views already expressed by some of our colleagues. I believe it will be in bad taste if we go ahead and hold a plenary on Thursday. I have a proposal which I want to put forward for your consideration. Will it be possible for us to hold a plenary on Tuesday? And if it is not possible for the Norwegian official to address the meeting on Tuesday, the visit could be rescheduled for another period. I wish to call to your attention that even in Rio de Janeiro, where a very important meeting is currently being held, that is, the Earth Summit, Thursday has been declared a public holiday and I believe that there will be no session on Thursday, 11 June, at the Earth Summit.

Mr. AL-HASSAN (Oman) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I should first like to congratulate you on your presidency of this Conference and, following on from what has been said by speakers from Islamic and other delegations, particularly His Excellency, the Ambassador of Nigeria, I would like to mention that there is a summit being held at head of State and other levels, namely the Earth Summit. Changes have been made to the Summit in view of the time schedule and previous commitments of such heads of State to ensure that it takes account of the holy religious ceremonies of a number of delegations. My delegation would like to take part in the plenaries of the Conference on Disarmament and we therefore support the request submitted by these delegations to change the Conference timetable. My delegation supports the proposal for 9 June next week.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Oman for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now have a list of three colleagues who wish to speak. I would ask you that, perhaps after hearing our friends from Norway, Canada and Peru, we may in the interests of all take a decision that would enable us to move forward in keeping with our tradition. I give the floor to the representative of Norway.

Mr. BERNHARDSEN (Norway): In my view, it is important to respect religious holidays and I believe we should do what we can to accommodate this wish. To the comment by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, I believe the lunar movements are pretty time-predictable and that this holiday probably was known earlier this year, but the reason for taking the floor was to ask the plenary whether Wednesday or Friday would be available dates, and also whether we would have at this very moment to make a decision on next week's schedule, or whether there would be other ways to make a decision. I would, of course, have to refer to my Ministry to see whether my State Secretary would be available, but I believe maybe Wednesday or Friday could be easier from her perspective.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): Mr. President, since I am speaking to you for the first time, let me also join those in offering you our best wishes in your tasks during this important month. The Canadian delegation became aware of the likelihood of the Feast of the Holy Sacrifice falling next Thursday only as a result of the last CWC bureau meeting, but it has given us a little while to think about what that might imply, and I am speaking now in our capacity as a single delegation and not on behalf of the Western Group, which we happen to be also the Coordinator for this month, because I have not had a chance to consult my colleagues. I fully sympathize with the wish of our Muslim colleagues not to work on Thursday next week and I believe it would be the wish of the Western Group to go along with that wish and to accommodate it. Saying that, however, I am not so sure that we would also want to agree with Ambassador Azikiwe's proposal that we shift the plenary to Tuesday or that we try to fit in for next week a second meeting on "Transparency in armaments", and I say that simply because I believe that in our present circumstances it is important that we not, by rearranging our programme, defer substantive work on the chemical weapons convention Ad Hoc Committee negotiations. So that led me, before hearing from our Norwegian colleague in his last intervention, to recall the fact that we do have a tradition of holding special plenaries for distinguished visitors, and having looked at the timetable it seems to me that the place where a special plenary might most easily be fitted in would indeed be the afternoon of Wednesday, 10 June or possibly even a brief interruption of our normal consultations among groups on Wednesday morning. However, the afternoon would be easier because we all do normally meet in the morning, and the two discussions that are taking place in the chemical weapons field on Wednesday are discussions at which normally experts participate, so that that should make it possible to staff both the plenary that afternoon and to continue work on the two CW issues. I don't know if that proposal would meet with general approval here and, of course, it would depend on whether or not State Secretary Mrs. Helga Hernes can be here and we don't know that yet. But I think that my inclination as a delegation, even though we had, in fact, planned to deliver a statement next Thursday on our own behalf which we can't have ready sooner, would be not to substitute a regular plenary but rather just to drop the plenary on Thursday and go on to next week's regular schedule. In other words, stick to the programme except for the fact that either we would have a special plenary on Wednesday perhaps, or possibly Friday, but not to try to replace the two meetings we would lose. The only other thing I would like to comment on is that this will mean that there will be a lot of secretariat personnel available on Thursday who will not be working, and that is unfortunate given our budgetary constraints, but I don't know how we can get around that unless those of us who are not going to be on holiday can find other things to do with their time that might use those resources.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I can see that several of our colleagues are interested in taking the floor, but I think we are in a situation that is very easy, easy to solve. Consequently, after listening to our colleagues from Peru and Morocco, I think we can adopt a practical solution that we will all be very happy with. I give the floor to the representative of Peru, Minister Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): My delegation considers that the objections raised by our friends who practise the Muslim religion are justified, and obviously we have to avoid needlessly ruffling the sensibilities of the States representated here and also we have to avoid giving those who are honouring us with their presence this morning the impression that this is a more complicated problem than negotiating article IX of the future convention. As you put it very well, this is a very simple matter. Very specifically I should like to suggest that we delegate to you and the Secretary-General, in consultation with the delegation of Norway, the task of moving next week's plenary meeting to Tuesday morning or Wednesday morning. I think the regional groups have no problem with delaying their consultations. I hope that the distinguished Norwegian visitor will have time either on Tuesday or Wednesday morning and we will settle the problem once and for all. In any event, if her presence is not possible owing to an already duly planned schedule, I think that the coming week's formal plenary could in any case take place either on Tuesday or on Wednesday.

Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to associate my delegation with those that have already congratulated you on taking up the presidency of this Conference and wished you every success in your noble task. I do not wish to complicate this debate. I would just like to say that naturally, of course, my delegation shares the views expressed by those that felt that next Thursday should be a day of rest within the Conference. However, following the second statement made by the distinguished representative of Norway, my delegation suggests that the Conference should give the distinguished delegation of Norway carte blanche to decide itself on the time and date when it would like the Conference to receive Her Excellency the Norwegian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement, and I am happy to see that we are all in agreement on finding a solution that will enable us to accommodate the interests of all delegations, and in particular such important interests as the celebration of religious holidays. I can see that there is consensus that we should not hold any meetings on Thursday 11th. So we shall cancel the plenary on Thursday 11th in the morning and I shall initiate consultations with the delegations concerned and the delegation of Norway to see whether we can plan the plenary meeting on Wednesday 10th or Friday 12th, so that the Conference can hear the important statement by the State Secretary of Norway and also continue dealing with the important subjects before it. Consequently, the timetable of meetings we have for the coming week will be amended and announced to all delegations. Also, in accordance with what the Ambassador of Egypt has indicated, we shall try and give the subject of transparency in armaments what place we can in keeping with our programme of work. If there are no further comments, we may say that it is so decided. The secretariat will inform us of the results of the consultations.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As I announced at the outset of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on substantive questions pertaining to item 3 of the agenda, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Following that, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will meet in room V at 12.30 p.m.

I have no further business, and unless any other delegation wishes to speak I think we can adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be the result of consultations with the delegations concerned.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.624
10 June 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 10 June 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Roberto García Moritán (Argentina)

GE.92-61744/4586B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 624th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all I should like to perform the pleasant task of extending a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to Her Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes. In doing so, I wish to convey to her my appreciation for her kindness in moving her visit to this plenary meeting, as a result of a change of date requested by some of our colleagues last week. The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway is well known to us all, since she has contributed to our work on various occasions, the first time in September 1988, shortly after taking up the duties she is still performing today. I am sure the Conference will listen to her statement with special interest. I also wish her a profitable stay in Geneva, at this decisive stage of our negotiations for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Norway, Nigeria, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Iraq. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes.

Mrs. HERNES (Norway): May I first of all say that my delegation is very pleased to see you, Ambassador Moritán, preside over the Conference? This is a critical moment for the CD's efforts to negotiate a CW treaty and your wise guidance will, I am sure, contribute greatly to the success of these efforts. I would also like to express respect for the excellent leadership of Algeria's Ambassador Semichi in his period as President of the Conference. Since I spoke here last time, Ambassador Berasategui has taken over as Secretary-General of the CD, and we are very pleased to see him in this important position. He has often given kind assistance to our delegation in the past.

Once again we are meeting against the backdrop of significant achievements in the field of arms control. The obstacles to ratification and entry into force of the START and CFE treaties have been removed. The entire world community benefits from these developments. The CFE Treaty is a cornerstone of the new European architecture. It epitomizes a qualitatively new stage in European security relations. At the same time, it provides insurance against another build-up of conventional armaments with offensive capabilities. In other words, the CFE Treaty codifies the declared intention of the States parties to live in peace with each other and to refrain from the use of armed force except in response to armed aggression. This is why we welcome the 15 May Tashkent agreement among the States of the former Soviet Union on rights and obligations under the CFE Treaty. As confirmed at the Oslo extraordinary conference of the parties to the Treaty, this agreement provides reassuring evidence of the firm intention of the States concerned to contribute actively and constructively to European security and stability. We welcome this accomplishment in view of the many complex military and political issues intertwined with the question of the redistribution of CFE rights and obligations. Those parties which have not already done so must now ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. Ratification and entry into force in time for

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

the 10 July CSCE summit in Helsinki would provide a powerful impetus to further progress in security cooperation among the members of the CSCE community, as would a timely completion of the follow-up CFE IA negotiations.

The 23 May Lisbon agreements on START-related matters are of comparable significance. They pave the way for early ratification and entry into force of this landmark treaty, providing for sizeable cuts in strategic nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability. This breakthrough was possible only because of the sense of direction and responsibility of the parties concerned, and the untiring efforts of the United States were instrumental in bringing about this positive outcome and should be particularly commended.

The Lisbon agreements will strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We welcome the commitments of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become non-nuclear-weapon States. We urge these States to negotiate safeguard agreements with IAEA as soon as possible. But like the Tashkent agreement on CFE, the Lisbon agreement is only the first step, albeit a highly important one, and the parties concerned must waste no time in proceeding to consolidation of the 23 May achievements by early ratification and implementation of the START Treaty.

While prospects for further progress in arms control, conventional as well as nuclear, are encouraging, the increasing frequency of conflicts related to ethnic rivalries and minorities issues are a source of growing concern. In this context we need only consider the tragic and cross-border violence in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Similar conflicts, potentially as brutal and ferocious as those in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh, loom on the horizon. CSCE has a vital role to play in this regard, in cooperation with and drawing upon the resources of other existing institutions, such as the European Community, the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The option of peace-keeping activities of various kinds should be a key element of the overall conflict prevention and crisis management capability of CSCE. This would be a useful supplement to the peace-keeping role of the United Nations. CSCE should in our view retain overall political guidance and control of any peace-keeping activity carried out under its auspices. Particularly in connection with larger-scale activities, however, CSCE should retain the option of drawing upon the resources and expertise of existing organizations such as NATO and WEU. CSCE does not have the necessary infrastructure, whereas NATO does. At its 4 June ministerial meeting in Oslo, the Alliance declared itself ready to make available to CSCE its resources and expertise in connection with peace-keeping operations, and this important declaration should be followed by a similar statement on the part of the CSCE summit next month.

The Conference on Disarmament has recently made great strides towards a complete treaty text banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, as well as the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. My Government expects the treaty to be ready for signature later this year. We wholeheartedly congratulate Ambassador von Wagner of Germany and his team

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

for their achievements in producing a complete and balanced draft treaty. The Australian draft text, presented in March this year by Foreign Secretary Evans, has also served to bring the negotiations forward. On the basis of these efforts a final result is now within reach, and this unique opportunity for a CW convention that can gain universal acceptance should not be missed. Norway is strongly committed to early accession to the treaty. However, complicated issues remain to be resolved in the few weeks ahead. In particular, we need to find an acceptable compromise solution as regards the verification regime. All the parties involved must show flexibility on all the outstanding issues. We must not allow our vision of a perfect agreement to prevent us from adopting a good one. We must not waste an historic opportunity because of lack of consensus on a few minor details.

In connection with the preparation of a CW convention, Norway has for the last decade submitted technical studies to the Conference on Disarmament on verification of possible use of CW in the field. We are about to submit the eleventh report in this series, which deals with operating procedures for sampling and sample handling. A programme for training experts and scholars from developing countries in taking samples in the field is now also being offered by Norway. It is believed that the training programme will also be of benefit in the control of insecticides in developing countries.

For many years the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) has been a central Norwegian foreign policy goal. A total, permanent ban on all nuclear testing is essential in order to halt effectively both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other important reasons for the discontinuation of all nuclear test explosions are the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear explosions. Accidents and venting may occur and could have serious consequences, and this is why my Government is concerned about nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya, which is an archipelago located in a vulnerable Arctic environment. The CD is the appropriate forum to deal with the issue of a nuclear test ban. We regret that it has not yet proved possible to establish a working group on the test ban issue in the CD.

Norway attaches great importance to and takes an active part in the efforts of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to design and test a global seismic network which could monitor a comprehensive nuclear test ban. An up-to-date global seismic network would form an essential part of the verification regime of a CTBT. The large-scale GSETT-2 experiment undertaken by the Group last year will provide an excellent basis for the Group's further work in revising the initial design concepts for such a global network.

We welcome the Russian moratorium on nuclear tests and hope that this unilateral test ban will be continued beyond its present scope. I also welcome the French decision, announced by President Mitterrand on 8 April, to abstain from further testing this year. But the time spans of earlier moratoriums on nuclear test bans have proved to be limited. Experience shows that if such unilateral steps are not followed by other countries, there is

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

growing pressure to resume testing. The aim must therefore be to secure a negotiated permanent global test ban. Meanwhile, we urge all nuclear-weapon States to halt their nuclear testing activities.

Some time ago Foreign Minister Stoltenberg took the initiative to prepare an expert report on questions related to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In cooperation with the Norwegian Advisory Council for Arms Control and Disarmament, we invited a group of internationally recognized experts to prepare contributions to the report. The report, which was finalized at a workshop in Oslo in March this year, calls for a comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1995. The concluding chapter of this report, distributed as document CD/1151, states that the reasons usually put forward for continuing nuclear tests are losing credibility and that the environmental effects of continued testing and the dangers of nuclear proliferation are the two overriding issues necessitating a CTB.

There is reason to believe that the non-proliferation regime will be strengthened by a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the only global instrument through which States can make a formal commitment not to acquire or to assist other States in acquiring nuclear weapons. It is especially encouraging to note that a number of States have recently acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, among them South Africa and the nuclear-weapon State China. France has decided to follow suit. The intention of the new republics in the former Soviet Union to adhere to the NPT is also an important step towards universal adherence to the Treaty. It is now essential that the safeguards control system of IAEA be further strengthened and that the organization be provided with adequate financial resources to maintain a credible level of supervision.

The Gulf war and its aftermath have clearly highlighted the threat to international security posed by the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Control of weapons technology, particularly nuclear technology, is a global concern which is becoming increasingly urgent. The multilateral export control regimes already in place have been established to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. However, proliferation control must also be grounded on regional conflict resolution, crisis prevention, confidence-building and arms control.

In the years to come, the world community should make a significant shift in the allocation of resources, away from armaments and towards development and the protection of our environment. Sustainable development necessitates a reduction of excessive military expenditure.

In recent years major achievements have been made in the area of disarmament. The CFE and START treaties represent cornerstones in this development. The NPT regime has been strengthened. A CW treaty could be a fitting culmination of the arduous efforts of the Conference on Disarmament over many years. It would not, however, make the CD superfluous. There are many important challenges for the CD in the years ahead. Transparency in armaments and the questions of non-proliferation are important issues to

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

consider in the future. There is clearly a need for the CD as a multilateral negotiating body. But we also see a need for this Conference to become more efficient. The agenda, which is largely inherited from the past, should be attuned to the most urgent security problems of the day.

We would also argue for an expansion of the CD. Increasing its membership would broaden the political basis for the negotiations and enable it to benefit from the experience and contributions of a larger group of nations. Since 1986 Norway has been the endorsed Western Group candidate for membership, and we continue to hope that the decision to expand the CD can be implemented without further delay.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Her Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway for her statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am pleased to see you, the distinguished representative of Argentina, preside over our work. I am confident that with your vast diplomatic experience and well-known personal abilities, you will successfully discharge your responsibilities in the days ahead. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, for the able manner in which he conducted the work of the Conference during his presidency.

A number of colleagues have left us since I last took the floor. I wish them every success in their future endeavours. Similarly, I would like to welcome our new colleagues who recently joined us - Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Tanaka of Japan. May I also use this opportunity to wish Ambassador Juraj Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic every success in his future endeavours? His constructive contributions to our work are appreciated by all delegations.

We are fortunate to have with us this morning the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes. My delegation listened with great interest to her important statement.

The first part of my statement today will deal with our work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The prospects of concluding an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention are now far more promising. Despite minor differences, there are clear indications that the time is now ripe to get down to the final drafting of the convention. My delegation recalls that the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, last March in a plenary statement introduced a text. Though not an alternative or substitute for the "rolling text", it offered a model for the acceleration of the ongoing negotiations.

Similarly, the consultations conducted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during the inter-sessional period have borne out the importance that delegations attach to the early conclusion of a convention.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

My delegation commends the efforts of Ambassador von Wagner in producing working paper 400 for the final phase of the negotiation. Although chemical weapons have become an inescapable part of the human heritage, Nigeria remains committed to the early conclusion of the convention.

We do not assume the pretentious posture that the remaining obstacles can be subjected to simplistic solutions. The international community, however, has the obligation to strive together in resolving the remaining problems. The convention is within reach and a spirit of mutual concession is required on the part of all delegations in ensuring a balanced agreement that would enjoy universal adherence.

The chemical weapons convention is of special significance to Nigeria's nascent chemical industry. The importance we attach to the convention stems from our desire to achieve an agreement consistent with global security concerns, but at the same time guarantees that the development of our chemical industry will not be unduly impeded. In other words, there should be a balance between the security concerns of the convention and the developmental needs of the States parties. States parties to the convention should be seen to be deriving benefits denied to non-States parties.

My delegation is still concerned that the proposed restriction of certain chemicals would adversely affect a wide range of industries in the chemical field, because of their heavy dependence on the importation of raw materials, including chemical agents. Indeed, it could result in supplies being hampered, creating protracted delays and the resultant escalation in their prices. We believe that the existing export control measures in the chemical industry should be abolished when the convention enters into force. Article XI of the convention should be credible and devoid of any loopholes that could be exploited to the disadvantage of States parties. We should avoid such measures that would weaken the provisions of this article, bearing in mind the potential benefits. The convention should not be seen as creating a split regime in any article, rather it should help to foster international cooperation in the field of chemical activities amongst States parties.

The success of any disarmament agreement depends on the level of confidence the States parties have that others are fulfilling their obligations. Verification primarily performs this function. Verification is not an end in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The verification arrangements and procedures for the future chemical weapons convention should be fair, equitable, non-discriminatory and must not be unduly intrusive. It must not jeopardize the economic, technological and social development of States parties.

We are, however, concerned at the current attempts to create a more stringent verification regime for schedule 3 production facilities than their schedule 2 counterparts. The schedule 2 chemicals pose a greater risk to the convention than the schedule 3 chemicals. Thus, it seems logical to maintain

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

a tighter control on chemicals in terms of their recognized risk to the convention. This should subsequently be reflected in the required threshold for inspection.

While the conduct of routine inspection should be left to the technical secretariat, we believe that challenge inspection is, however, qualitatively different, since it is initiated by a State party, and intended to address some specific doubts and concerns. This gives it a political and sensitive character which has made the negotiation of article IX rather difficult. Obviously, the image of a State party, the challenged State, will be at stake. My delegation feels that the inspection procedure should be a collective exercise from the beginning to the end. Hence, the executive council should be involved in decision-making both before and after the inspection. Adequate measures, however, must be taken to discourage frivolous and abusive requests from States parties.

Nigeria believes that the executive council should play an important role in the implementation of the future chemical weapons convention. In this regard, we support the principle of equitable geographical distribution and the importance of chemical industry in allocating regional as well as global seats in this body. We note with satisfaction the current efforts of Friend of the Chair Ambassador Tóth of Hungary in finding a common formula. My delegation earlier indicated its preference for the first of the two options as contained in his non-paper of yesterday. Whatever criteria applicable should be universal.

The issue of financing the organization is equally important. Without adequate funds, the implementation of the convention will be in jeopardy. We believe that every State party should contribute to the running of the organization. However, any scale of assessment devised should reflect the specific nature of the convention, bearing in mind the chemical industry capacity of States parties.

As we look forward to the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, the threat posed by nuclear weapons continues to loom large in our minds. The issue of a nuclear test ban and indeed nuclear disarmament remain priority items on our agenda. Nigeria has always expressed the view that the acquisition of nuclear weapons cannot guarantee genuine international peace and security. Thus, we have consistently called for urgent and concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation welcomes the decision by France to suspend nuclear weapons testing in 1992 and to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We also welcome the recent signing of the Protocol to the START Treaty in Lisbon by the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. However, we believe that unilateral and bilateral initiatives only complement multilateral efforts. The Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament has the responsibility of initiating negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

My delegation is disappointed that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has not been re-established due to lack of agreement on an appropriate mandate. We must not allow the golden opportunity provided by the recent initiatives on the reduction of nuclear arms to elude us. The post-cold-war era has created a favourable political environment for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate.

The world is in need of an effective international agreement that bans nuclear weapon testing in all environments for all time. The international community must take necessary measures to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test ban will be the first step in this direction. This would strengthen the present non-proliferation regime and ensure universal adherence.

The CD, reflecting the current changes in the international political system, decided recently to include a new item, "Transparency in armaments", in its agenda. My delegation fully supports this decision and will make its own contribution to the deliberations on this item. We believe that transparency and openness in armaments could enhance confidence-building among member States, thereby strengthening regional and international peace and security. However, the item has to be considered in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve its objectives. The production, stockpiling, accumulation and transfer of arms should all be given equal and adequate attention.

In conclusion, the Conference on Disarmament must confront its approved programme of work and adopt a more realistic, flexible and rewarding approach to accomplishing it. We must set our house in order by being responsive to the aspirations of mankind. We now have an unprecedented opportunity to advance towards the objectives of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, I must, at the outset join you in welcoming Her Excellency the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, and express appreciation for the statement she has just made.

Today I should like to make a statement on behalf of the Western Group on agenda items 2 and 3. The Western Group welcomes discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament because we believe that such discussions play a positive role in strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age. It remains the view of the Western Group that the prevention of nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in the broader context of the prevention of war in general.

Peace and security can be achieved only through full observance of the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations and of other relevant obligations under international law. The maintenance and enhancement of

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

international security depend on responsible behaviour in relations between States. Such behaviour should strictly abide by the provisions contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, as well as other relevant obligations. However, the responsible conduct of States in maintaining international and national security requires more than just refraining from aggression. States should also demonstrate respect for international peace and security by engaging in measures of arms control, arms reduction and confidence-building.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, nuclear disarmament remains one of our highest priorities. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, all must be actively involved and contribute to measures of disarmament and arms limitation. It is a matter of necessity for all to make progress in this field.

Nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest threats to worldwide security and stability. The further proliferation of nuclear weapons would affect the security of all States. Thus, nuclear disarmament and the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear arms, particularly following the political changes of the last 12 months, represent one of the most serious challenges, and demand the attention and commitment of all members of the CD.

The last 18 months have seen some positive steps in the process of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. First, the satisfactory implementation of the INF Treaty, which achieved in 1991 the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons. This is an important factor of increased stability.

Second, the conclusion of the START Treaty and the subsequent initiatives of Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. We welcome the recent progress made by the United States and Russia towards further reductions in their nuclear arsenals and we wish to encourage efforts in this direction. We also welcome the recent signing in Lisbon of the protocol to the START Treaty signed by the United States, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia which will allow for the entry into force of the START Treaty.

Third, since the world situation has improved the United States is not building any nuclear weapons nor manufacturing plutonium or weapons-grade uranium for weapon production purposes for the first time since 1945.

Fourth, the unilateral decisions taken by the United States and the former USSR to eliminate all land-based short-range nuclear weapons. We express the hope that the implementation of these measures will take place in the best possible conditions of security and transparency. These initiatives should lead to further far-reaching steps in order to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible levels of forces.

Fifth, negotiations on defence and space issues, including the relationship between means of strategic offence and defence, have taken place between the United States and the former USSR. We strongly support the continuation of these negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

The other nuclear Powers who are members of the Western Group have also made meaningful contributions to the process of nuclear disarmament by making reductions in some of their nuclear weapon programmes.

We welcome recent initiatives in southern Africa, in particular the accession of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia to the NPT and the safeguards agreements with IAEA, as well as the moves towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its fifty-fourth ordinary session held in Abuja in May-June 1991.

We welcome major and positive initiatives in Latin America such as the "Mendoza Declaration", the "Cartagena Declaration", commitments entered into by Argentina and Brazil establishing full-scope safeguards regimes with IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, and the French decision to ratify Additional Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

We consider that in parallel with wider adherence to the NPT, and in view of recent events, a further strengthening and improvement of safeguards implementation are desirable, as well as of nuclear export controls. We support proposals recently made to this end.

We welcome the progress made by IAEA in its efforts towards strengthening the Agency's safeguards systems. We hope that these efforts will be supported by all members.

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime are key instruments for the control of transfers of sensitive nuclear and missile materials, technology and equipment. We welcome recent decisions of the NSG to control exports of nuclear-related dual-use items and to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. We recognize the legitimate interest of the international community in the transfer of high technology for civil purposes and wish that discussion and cooperation will continue in this field.

It is important that this Conference continues to keep abreast of all disarmament initiatives and in particular encourages the process of nuclear disarmament. The Western Group welcomes recent progress and will continue to work towards the objective of achieving lasting international peace and security.

Mr. ALMUSAWI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to begin my statement by stating how pleased I am to have the honour of addressing you in this distinguished body. I wish you every success during your term as President of the Conference. May I at the same time state our great appreciation for the sincere efforts made in this forum to attain its noble objectives?

During the past few years, the life of the international community has been characterized by such interdependence that it has become necessary for all States to participate in the common endeavour of mankind in conformity

(Mr. Almusawi, Iraq)

with international law and without any dual interpretation of that law. The most pressing need is that of building a world in which war would no longer be a means of settling problems, a world where there would be no threat of annihilation, where peace, justice and equity would reign, as would criteria that would bring equality to all peoples and nations of our planet. Realization of this high objective must be brought about, inter alia, through the adoption of disarmament measures that are just and balanced and can safeguard the right of every State to security without any country or group of countries obtaining privileges at any stage. On the basis of this view, as contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, Iraq has participated in the work of the Conference on Disarmament as an observer since 1989, and it is drawing on that view that we have advocated expansion of the Conference on Disarmament to include all countries which so wish.

This year the work of the Conference on Disarmament is moving actively towards concluding a convention on a chemical weapons ban. While we appreciate most sincerely the efforts being carried out here to conclude the convention, we and many other peoples of the world hope to see a convention which will rid our planet of all chemical weapons without exception. The accession by all countries to this key convention, its objective and rigorous implementation and the non-inclusion of any measure that would impede scientific progress in developing countries or constitute a means of intervening in their domestic affairs are among the elements for its success. Furthermore, universal accession to the convention and its equal application to all countries, large or small, are exceptionally important to ensuring that no State party finds itself at the mercy of a State that is not party to the convention or another State party which fails to implement its terms.

Furthermore, despite the extreme importance attributed by the international community to a chemical weapons ban, this question should not be the sole focus of attention from this unique multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Progress should be made in other areas, particularly those falling within the competence of the ad hoc committees on nuclear weapons, given the maximum priority that the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly attributed to effective measures for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war.

The decades that have passed since the establishment of this negotiating forum without effective measures having been taken on the items relating to nuclear disarmament are lost decades. However, hope remains that the ad hoc committees on nuclear weapons will be given appropriate mandates allowing them to embark on negotiations on halting the nuclear arms race, on a nuclear test ban, and on nuclear disarmament.

We welcome the bilateral efforts aimed at limiting certain categories of nuclear weapons, but they can never replace multilateral efforts in an area which is so important for the future of mankind as a whole. For this reason, bilateral and multilateral efforts should be complementary and should facilitate each other. The Conference on Disarmament must play an active role in this respect.

(Mr. Almusawi, Iraq)

Although the majority of the world's countries attach importance to international efforts on nuclear disarmament, this is a matter of exceptional importance to our Arab region due to its inherent instability, which stems from Israel's possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, its occupation of the territories of more than one Arab State and its refusal to acknowledge the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost among these being its right to self-determination and to establish an independent State on its national soil.

Because of its refusal to accept foreign domination and hegemony, my country has for some time been the target of an unjust campaign which assumes various pretexts. The campaign reached its height in the use by the United States and its allies of armed force against my country on the pretext of implementing Security Council resolution 678 (1990). However, many facts have revealed that the true goal of the aggression against my country was to destroy its life and economic infrastructure. In this respect, I must quote Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who said in his report on his visit to Iraq from 10 to 17 March 1991 that the recent conflict had wrought near-apocalyptic results on the economic infrastructure of Iraq. In this brutal military aggression, the bombs dropped on my country were equivalent to seven of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima. The United States and the United Kingdom also used various weapons which are banned internationally, including depleted-uranium (U-238) bombs containing toxic chemicals and radioactive materials which threaten to cause large-scale human and environmental disaster.

Following this organized destruction of Iraq's basic infrastructure and the means of its civilian life, Security Council resolution 687 was adopted on 30 April 1992, under the title of the "cease-fire resolution". This resolution imposed measures and conditions on Iraq that are unprecedented in the history of this international organization. I will not dwell on the details of its provisions, which are not within the direct concern of this forum. I will, however, specifically address the measures provided for in section C of resolution 687, which deals with disarmament and verification procedures. You are no doubt aware that this section of the resolution in particular flagrantly employs double standards in dealing with the subject of arms in our region, since Iraq alone has been obliged to destroy the remainder of its non-conventional weapons, whereas other States in the region, notably Israel, continue to possess such weapons. The Security Council has overlooked the fact that Israel is the only State in the region which was asked by the Security Council in resolution 487 (1981) to place all its nuclear facilities under international control.

Iraq agreed to implement resolution 687 and today, one year after the implementation of that resolution, I think it useful to highlight in this Conference some of the lessons drawn from the implementation of the provisions of the resolution on weapons.

The Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have carried out 37 inspection missions involving nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, and Iraq has cooperated with the team of

(Mr. Almusawi, Iraq)

inspectors in the context of their mission, as stated in detail in the letter from the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council dated 23 January 1992, yet despite this, certain influential States in the Security Council, particularly the United States and Great Britain, continue to cast doubt on the position of Iraq. Obviously, there are many reasons for maintaining this atmosphere of suspicion, including the wish to justify the criminal acts perpetrated during the military operations against Iraq outside the framework of resolution 678, and the wish to use the suspicion as a pretext to maintain the economic blockade imposed on the Iraqi people and to benefit from the powers and immunities extended to the inspection team with a view to interfering in the domestic affairs of my country. I regret that I must state most bitterly in this forum that measures for arms limitation and verification have come to be used as a tool in the hands of the influential States for perpetuating their suspect policies, without the slightest regard for the principles that should govern the action of the United Nations, such as objectivity, neutrality, integrity, professionalism and scrupulous commitment to the provisions of the Charter and international law.

The Americans, for example, foisted the largest possible number of their inspectors onto the inspection teams; they accounted for more than 50 per cent of the members of some nuclear inspection teams. It is logical to believe that some of them did not come to carry out the mission entrusted to them by the United Nations, but rather to serve the political purposes of the United States. For instance, David Kay, an intelligence officer, was conveying the information gathered from Baghdad directly to Washington. On 30 October 1991, Mr. Ekéus himself conceded that Washington had received information from David Kay on Iraqi documentation before it was received by the United Nations. Here I should perhaps mention remarks published on 22 October 1991 in the French newspaper Libération which were made by a French expert who was a member of the United Nations inspection teams in Iraq. Referring to his American colleagues, he said that "they are apparently United States intelligence agents who are working for the CIA, and not for the United Nations". The French expert also stated that the American inspectors deliberately attempted to create confrontation with the Iraqi side, and even hoped that a mission member would die in order to justify United States intervention.

It was noted that some of the Special Commission inspection teams were intent on acquiring information and scientific, technical and administrative reports that bore no relationship to the mandate of the Special Commission or the resolutions of the Security Council, thus confirming that some members of the inspection teams were endeavouring to obtain intelligence information for their own countries for suspect political purposes of which everyone is now aware. Moreover, the fact that certain inspection teams entered sites that had nothing to do with the inspection, such as prisons, sports grounds and educational institutions, reflects the premeditated desire to provoke Iraq and thus create an artificial crisis. Some inspection teams also entered the headquarters of regional and international organizations in Iraq, disregarding the immunities extended to such premises.

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Furthermore, overflights of Iraqi territory by United States U-2 spy-planes on the pretext of conducting aerial surveys for the Commission have recently reached an average of one overflight every 48 hours, lasting three to five hours, which clearly indicates that the primary beneficiary of the information and photographs collected by such aircraft is the United States and not the United Nations. It also indicates that the aircraft were originally used for American purposes which were continued through the United Nations.

The failure of the inspection team members to respect the confidential nature of the information gathered was such that on 5 December 1991, one such member, Mr. Leslie Thorn, extended invitations to an open lecture to be held in a restaurant at the United Nations offices in Vienna, where he was to talk about the tasks of the inspection teams in Iraq.

The examples I have cited are merely a drop in the ocean as far as the practices of some inspection team members are concerned; they reflect the methods used by certain influential countries to exploit the measures provided for under Security Council resolutions with respect to procedures for arms limitation and verification. These methods show one aspect of how these countries handle and interpret international measures. However, there is another aspect, no less excessive, which is that the campaign aimed at casting doubt on Iraq's position with respect to weapons and the artificial turmoil created by some inspection team members were exploited to obtain new Security Council resolutions containing more extremist provisions than those included in resolution 687; they now went beyond arms limitation to deprive our people of a free and dignified life and deny our country its industrial base.

All the interpretations, allegations and concoctions with respect to the Iraqi arms programme are either false, fabricated or exaggerated. The Government of Iraq has already affirmed, and reaffirms, that Iraq has never sought to possess nuclear weapons and that its political leadership has at no time adopted a decision to channel research being carried out by the Iraqi scientists who specialize in nuclear energy towards the manufacture of any type of nuclear weapon.

While pointing out the serious and deliberate transgressions that took place under the cover of implementation of Security Council resolutions on arms limitation and the arbitrary action that accompanied their implementation, we hope that the lessons learned from this period will help to overcome the arbitrariness, narrow-minded self-interest and pre-set political goals which some States apply in implementing the international resolutions on weapons, irrespective of the forum in which such resolutions were adopted and irrespective of the mechanism for implementation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have heard the statement made by the representative of Iraq, and I am grateful to him for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I am sorry to take the floor again and I certainly do not want to waste the Conference's time by responding at length to the rubbish to which we have just listened. I really wonder, however, if this Conference has ever had to listen to such a catalogue of lies and hypocrisy.

At the beginning of the representative of Iraq's statement I was quite touched, almost moved to tears indeed, by the concern which he was showing for the people of the Middle East and for the stability of the area. And I agree with him that there are very special reasons why Iraq should be involved in any negotiations on chemical weapons. I might suggest to him that there are reasons other than the desire of the Western countries to perpetuate their hegemony over Iraq why it is that the Security Council has taken the measures it has taken against his country. The suggestion that the use of armed force against Iraq was on the pretext of anything is totally rejected by my delegation. It was to put an end to an unprovoked act of aggression against a small neighbouring State, and as far as my delegation is concerned we are proud of what we did.

I am also quite amazed to listen to what the Iraqi representative says about the effect on the environment of the actions of the coalition forces. I can only suggest that he should go to Kuwait and see the effect on the environment there of what has been done, which has been brought about by the action of the Iraqis, where they have turned the desert into sea, a sea of oil, and where for a while they turned day into night.

I see absolutely no reason for the United Kingdom to have to cast doubt on the position of Iraq. It seems to me that there is no doubt and that the position of Iraq with regard to chemical and nuclear weapons is absolutely clear. It is a totally irresponsible attitude, and nothing which the Iraqi representative says will convince us otherwise. I would also reject the suggestion that the reason for the maintenance of the "blockade" against Iraq is anything but Iraq's failure to accept the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

I am sure we were all touched by his concern for the Iraqi people. It is surprising that there are any Iraqis left after the actions taken against them by his Government using any weapon to hand, including chemical weapons.

I am sorry to speak with such emotion, but frankly I cannot conceal my fury at the hypocrisy of the Iraqi representative and of his Government.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Let me support in every respect the statement just made by our distinguished colleague, the representative of the United Kingdom. We have all had to listen this morning to a self-serving, defensive and quite fanciful account of activities of representatives of the United Nations in carrying out decisions of the international community made with unprecedented unity of purpose. The allegations we have heard this morning are, of course, quite inappropriate for this forum. But since my country has been accused repeatedly by name, I am forced to take the floor to reject the accusations categorically. It is quite unnecessary to refute

(Mr. Breckon, United States)

each one of these allegations because the activities and the findings of the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq are well known in this room. The work of the dedicated personnel of the inspection teams, what they found, the obstacles they have had to encounter and overcome are particularly well known, and the remarks of the representative of Iraq will be judged correctly for what they are by everyone in this room.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Mr. Breckon for his statement. The representative of Iraq has asked me for the floor once again. I would like to remind him that we are in a negotiating body and not a deliberative body and I would therefore be grateful in giving him the floor if he would be brief in his statement.

Mr. ALMUSAWI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): I will start with your remark, Mr. President, and say that I very much appreciate your view that we are in a negotiating forum where everone expresses his or her opinion and leaves it to others to draw their own conclusions.

I regret the words used by the representative of the United Kingdom and find them inappropriate to this negotiating forum. I see no reason for his surfeit of anger unless he really believes that his country and the coalition forces exceeded the mandate specified under resolution 687 and began systematically to destroy Iraq under the veil of international legitimacy. My statement merely spoke of the fear that arms limitation and control measures would come to be used as a weapon by certain States to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries. I think this is one of the basic concerns preoccupying all delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and all those interested in the questions of international peace and security, transparency and so on. It was therefore logical for me to articulate our experience and he may articulate his own. However, I regret the words used and the allegations that Iraq used chemical weapons; I think this is a tune which is now well worn. He can tell me which forbidden weapons were used by the coalition forces against my country, against peace-lovers and against safe refuges. They include the depleted uranium to which I referred in my statement.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have taken note of your comments. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambass.dor Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I would like to add my voice to what was said by the representative of the United Kingdom and by the representative of the United States. And in so far as, in an oblique manner, my country, in the shape of a French expert who was quoted on many occasions in a press cutting, was cited in the statements by the representative of Iraq, whose thrust was to extend to France what he said about the United Kingdom and the United States, with whom we feel complete solidarity, I would just like to say this. Extremely serious accusations have been made, as well as statements that are totally groundless in disregard of the most elementary respect for the actual facts. The first fact is the origin of the decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council, that is, Iraq's invasion of the sovereign

(Mr. Errera, France)

State of Kuwait. The second fact, among others, is the violation by Iraq of its commitments vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency, a violation established and condemned by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 1991. Is there any need to remind you that all the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, starting with resolution 687, were adopted often unanimously, mostly with a very large majority, and were adopted in strict conformity with the responsibilities and rules of the supreme body of the international community - the same international community which, also by an overwhelming majority and repeatedly, has expressed its condemnation of Iraq's action?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no more speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? If not, the secretariat has, as usual, circulated today the timetable of meetings to be held during the coming week, in other words between 15 and 19 June. You will see that the timetable does not reflect meetings that may be held in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The activities of that subsidiary body are at present taking place in informal consultations, and so it is difficult to foresee the various meetings. That is why all that is indicated are the meetings the Committee will hold on Monday, 15 June at 5 p.m. and on 18 June at 3 p.m., and as you will see, a series of meetings on Monday morning, Tuesday morning and afternoon and Wednesday afternoon have been left open. In consultation with the secretariat I felt it would be appropriate to concentrate the other meetings of the Conference on Thursday and Friday as far as possible, in order to facilitate the meetings being held on the draft convention on chemical weapons, which must continue in their present form until Wednesday, 17 June. As always, the timetable is merely indicative and if necessary, we will amend it as circumstances dictate. If there are no objections I will take it that the Conference adopts this tentative timetable of meetings for the coming week.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As you will remember, during our last plenary we decided to cancel all tomorrow's meetings except for this plenary. Consequently, the informal meeting on the substance of item 2 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", which was to be held tomorrow, will be held, as the timetable indicates, after our plenary meeting on Thursday, 18 June.

I have no other items to take up, and so, unless any delegation wishes to speak, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.624*
10 June 1992

ENGLISH ONLY

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 10 June 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Roberto García Moritán (Argentina)

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* Re-issued for technical reasons

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 624th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all I should like to perform the pleasant task of extending a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to Her Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes. In doing so, I wish to convey to her my appreciation for her kindness in moving her visit to this plenary meeting, as a result of a change of date requested by some of our colleagues last week. The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway is well known to us all, since she has contributed to our work on various occasions, the first time in September 1988, shortly after taking up the duties she is still performing today. I am sure the Conference will listen to her statement with special interest. I also wish her a profitable stay in Geneva, at this decisive stage of our negotiations for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Norway, Nigeria, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Iraq. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes.

Mrs. HERNES (Norway): May I first of all say that my delegation is very pleased to see you, Ambassador Moritán, preside over the Conference? This is a critical moment for the CD's efforts to negotiate a CW treaty and your wise guidance will, I am sure, contribute greatly to the success of these efforts. I would also like to express respect for the excellent leadership of Algeria's Ambassador Semichi in his period as President of the Conference. Since I spoke here last time, Ambassador Berasategui has taken over as Secretary-General of the CD, and we are very pleased to see him in this important position. He has often given kind assistance to our delegation in the past.

Once again we are meeting against the backdrop of significant achievements in the field of arms control. The obstacles to ratification and entry into force of the START and CFE treaties have been removed. The entire world community benefits from these developments. The CFE Treaty is a cornerstone of the new European architecture. It epitomizes a qualitatively new stage in European security relations. At the same time, it provides insurance against another build-up of conventional armaments with offensive capabilities. In other words, the CFE Treaty codifies the declared intention of the States parties to live in peace with each other and to refrain from the use of armed force except in response to armed aggression. This is why we welcome the 15 May Tashkent agreement among the States of the former Soviet Union on rights and obligations under the CFE Treaty. As confirmed at the Oslo extraordinary conference of the parties to the Treaty, this agreement provides reassuring evidence of the firm intention of the States concerned to contribute actively and constructively to European security and stability. We welcome this accomplishment in view of the many complex military and political issues intertwined with the question of the redistribution of CFE rights and obligations. Those parties which have not already done so must now ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. Ratification and entry into force in time for

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

the 10 July CSCE summit in Helsinki would provide a powerful impetus to further progress in security cooperation among the members of the CSCE community, as would a timely completion of the follow-up CFE IA negotiations.

The 23 May Lisbon agreements on START-related matters are of comparable significance. They pave the way for early ratification and entry into force of this landmark treaty, providing for sizeable cuts in strategic nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability. This breakthrough was possible only because of the sense of direction and responsibility of the parties concerned, and the untiring efforts of the United States were instrumental in bringing about this positive outcome and should be particularly commended.

The Lisbon agreements will strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We welcome the commitments of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become non-nuclear-weapon States. We urge these States to negotiate safeguard agreements with IAEA as soon as possible. But like the Tashkent agreement on CFE, the Lisbon agreement is only the first step, albeit a highly important one, and the parties concerned must waste no time in proceeding to consolidation of the 23 May achievements by early ratification and implementation of the START Treaty.

While prospects for further progress in arms control, conventional as well as nuclear, are encouraging, the increasing frequency of conflicts related to ethnic rivalries and minorities issues are a source of growing concern. In this context we need only consider the tragic and cross-border violence in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Similar conflicts, potentially as brutal and ferocious as those in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh, loom on the horizon. CSCE has a vital role to play in this regard, in cooperation with and drawing upon the resources of other existing institutions, such as the European Community, the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The option of peace-keeping activities of various kinds should be a key element of the overall conflict prevention and crisis management capability of CSCE. This would be a useful supplement to the peace-keeping role of the United Nations. CSCE should in our view retain overall political guidance and control of any peace-keeping activity carried out under its auspices. Particularly in connection with larger-scale activities, however, CSCE should retain the option of drawing upon the resources and expertise of existing organizations such as NATO and WEU. CSCE does not have the necessary infrastructure, whereas NATO does. At its 4 June ministerial meeting in Oslo, the Alliance declared itself ready to make available to CSCE its resources and expertise in connection with peace-keeping operations, and this important declaration should be followed by a similar statement on the part of the CSCE summit next month.

The Conference on Disarmament has recently made great strides towards a complete treaty text banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, as well as the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. My Government expects the treaty to be ready for signature later this year. We wholeheartedly congratulate Ambassador von Wagner of Germany and his team

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

for their achievements in producing a complete and balanced draft treaty. The Australian draft text, presented in March this year by Foreign Secretary Evans, has also served to bring the negotiations forward. On the basis of these efforts a final result is now within reach, and this unique opportunity for a CW convention that can gain universal acceptance should not be missed. Norway is strongly committed to early accession to the treaty. However, complicated issues remain to be resolved in the few weeks ahead. In particular, we need to find an acceptable compromise solution as regards the verification regime. All the parties involved must show flexibility on all the outstanding issues. We must not allow our vision of a perfect agreement to prevent us from adopting a good one. We must not waste an historic opportunity because of lack of consensus on a few minor details.

In connection with the preparation of a CW convention, Norway has for the last decade submitted technical studies to the Conference on Disarmament on verification of possible use of CW in the field. We are about to submit the eleventh report in this series, which deals with operating procedures for sampling and sample handling. A programme for training experts and scholars from developing countries in taking samples in the field is now also being offered by Norway. It is believed that the training programme will also be of benefit in the control of insecticides in developing countries.

For many years the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) has been a central Norwegian foreign policy goal. A total, permanent ban on all nuclear testing is essential in order to halt effectively both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other important reasons for the discontinuation of all nuclear test explosions are the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear explosions. Accidents and venting may occur and could have serious consequences, and this is why my Government is concerned about nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya, which is an archipelago located in a vulnerable Arctic environment. The CD is the appropriate forum to deal with the issue of a nuclear test ban. We regret that it has not yet proved possible to establish a working group on the test ban issue in the CD.

Norway attaches great importance to and takes an active part in the efforts of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to design and test a global seismic network which could monitor a comprehensive nuclear test ban. An up-to-date global seismic network would form an essential part of the verification regime of a CTBT. The large-scale GSETT-2 experiment undertaken by the Group last year will provide an excellent basis for the Group's further work in revising the initial design concepts for such a global network.

We welcome the Russian moratorium on nuclear tests and hope that this unilateral test ban will be continued beyond its present scope. I also welcome the French decision, announced by President Mitterrand on 8 April, to abstain from further testing this year. But the time spans of earlier moratoriums on nuclear test bans have proved to be limited. Experience shows that if such unilateral steps are not followed by other countries, there is

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

growing pressure to resume testing. The aim must therefore be to secure a negotiated permanent global test ban. Meanwhile, we urge all nuclear-weapon States to halt their nuclear testing activities.

Some time ago Foreign Minister Stoltenberg took the initiative to prepare an expert report on questions related to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In cooperation with the Norwegian Advisory Council for Arms Control and Disarmament, we invited a group of internationally recognized experts to prepare contributions to the report. The report, which was finalized at a workshop in Oslo in March this year, calls for a comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1995. The concluding chapter of this report, distributed as document CD/1151, states that the reasons usually put forward for continuing nuclear tests are losing credibility and that the environmental effects of continued testing and the dangers of nuclear proliferation are the two overriding issues necessitating a CTB.

There is reason to believe that the non-proliferation regime will be strengthened by a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the only global instrument through which States can make a formal commitment not to acquire or to assist other States in acquiring nuclear weapons. It is especially encouraging to note that a number of States have recently acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, among them South Africa and the nuclear-weapon State China. France has decided to follow suit. The intention of the new republics in the former Soviet Union to adhere to the NPT is also an important step towards universal adherence to the Treaty. It is now essential that the safeguards control system of IAEA be further strengthened and that the organization be provided with adequate financial resources to maintain a credible level of supervision.

The Gulf war and its aftermath have clearly highlighted the threat to international security posed by the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Control of weapons technology, particularly nuclear technology, is a global concern which is becoming increasingly urgent. The multilateral export control regimes already in place have been established to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. However, proliferation control must also be grounded on regional conflict resolution, crisis prevention, confidence-building and arms control.

In the years to come, the world community should make a significant shift in the allocation of resources, away from armaments and towards development and the protection of our environment. Sustainable development necessitates a reduction of excessive military expenditure.

In recent years major achievements have been made in the area of disarmament. The CFE and START treaties represent cornerstones in this development. The NPT regime has been strengthened. A CW treaty could be a fitting culmination of the arduous efforts of the Conference on Disarmament over many years. It would not, however, make the CD superfluous. There are many important challenges for the CD in the years ahead. Transparency in armaments and the questions of non-proliferation are important issues to

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

consider in the future. There is clearly a need for the CD as a multilateral negotiating body. But we also see a need for this Conference to become more efficient. The agenda, which is largely inherited from the past, should be attuned to the most urgent security problems of the day.

We would also argue for an expansion of the CD. Increasing its membership would broaden the political basis for the negotiations and enable it to benefit from the experience and contributions of a larger group of nations. Since 1986 Norway has been the endorsed Western Group candidate for membership, and we continue to hope that the decision to expand the CD can be implemented without further delay.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Her Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway for her statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am pleased to see you, the distinguished representative of Argentina, preside over our work. I am confident that with your vast diplomatic experience and well-known personal abilities, you will successfully discharge your responsibilities in the days ahead. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, for the able manner in which he conducted the work of the Conference during his presidency.

A number of colleagues have left us since I last took the floor. I wish them every success in their future endeavours. Similarly, I would like to welcome our new colleagues who recently joined us - Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Tanaka of Japan. May I also use this opportunity to wish Ambassador Juraj Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic every success in his future endeavours? His constructive contributions to our work are appreciated by all delegations.

We are fortunate to have with us this morning the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Helga Hernes. My delegation listened with great interest to her important statement.

The first part of my statement today will deal with our work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The prospects of concluding an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention are now far more promising. Despite minor differences, there are clear indications that the time is now ripe to get down to the final drafting of the convention. My delegation recalls that the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, last March in a plenary statement introduced a text. Though not an alternative or substitute for the "rolling text", it offered a model for the acceleration of the ongoing negotiations.

Similarly, the consultations conducted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee during the inter-sessional period have borne out the importance that delegations attach to the early conclusion of a convention.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

My delegation commends the efforts of Ambassador von Wagner in producing working paper 400 for the final phase of the negotiation. Although chemical weapons have become an inescapable part of the human heritage, Nigeria remains committed to the early conclusion of the convention.

We do not assume the pretentious posture that the remaining obstacles can be subjected to simplistic solutions. The international community, however, has the obligation to strive together in resolving the remaining problems. The convention is within reach and a spirit of mutual concession is required on the part of all delegations in ensuring a balanced agreement that would enjoy universal adherence.

The chemical weapons convention is of special significance to Nigeria's nascent chemical industry. The importance we attach to the convention stems from our desire to achieve an agreement consistent with global security concerns, but at the same time guarantees that the development of our chemical industry will not be unduly impeded. In other words, there should be a balance between the security concerns of the convention and the developmental needs of the States parties. States parties to the convention should be seen to be deriving benefits denied to non-States parties.

My delegation is still concerned that the proposed restriction of certain chemicals would adversely affect a wide range of industries in the chemical field, because of their heavy dependence on the importation of raw materials, including chemical agents. Indeed, it could result in supplies being hampered, creating protracted delays and the resultant escalation in their prices. We believe that the existing export control measures in the chemical industry should be abolished when the convention enters into force. Article XI of the convention should be credible and devoid of any loopholes that could be exploited to the disadvantage of States parties. We should avoid such measures that would weaken the provisions of this article, bearing in mind the potential benefits. The convention should not be seen as creating a split regime in any article, rather it should help to foster international cooperation in the field of chemical activities amongst States parties.

The success of any disarmament agreement depends on the level of confidence the States parties have that others are fulfilling their obligations. Verification primarily performs this function. Verification is not an end in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The verification arrangements and procedures for the future chemical weapons convention should be fair, equitable, non-discriminatory and must not be unduly intrusive. It must not jeopardize the economic, technological and social development of States parties.

We are, however, concerned at the current attempts to create a more stringent verification regime for schedule 3 production facilities than their schedule 2 counterparts. The schedule 2 chemicals pose a greater risk to the convention than the schedule 3 chemicals. Thus, it seems logical to maintain

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

a tighter control on chemicals in terms of their recognized risk to the convention. This should subsequently be reflected in the required threshold for inspection.

While the conduct of routine inspection should be left to the technical secretariat, we believe that challenge inspection is, however, qualitatively different, since it is initiated by a State party, and intended to address some specific doubts and concerns. This gives it a political and sensitive character which has made the negotiation of article IX rather difficult. Obviously, the image of a State party, the challenged State, will be at stake. My delegation feels that the inspection procedure should be a collective exercise from the beginning to the end. Hence, the executive council should be involved in decision-making both before and after the inspection. Adequate measures, however, must be taken to discourage frivolous and abusive requests from States parties.

Nigeria believes that the executive council should play an important role in the implementation of the future chemical weapons convention. In this regard, we support the principle of equitable geographical distribution and the importance of chemical industry in allocating regional as well as global seats in this body. We note with satisfaction the current efforts of Friend of the Chair Ambassador Tóth of Hungary in finding a common formula. My delegation earlier indicated its preference for the first of the two options as contained in his non-paper of yesterday. Whatever criteria applicable should be universal.

The issue of financing the organization is equally important. Without adequate funds, the implementation of the convention will be in jeopardy. We believe that every State party should contribute to the running of the organization. However, any scale of assessment devised should reflect the specific nature of the convention, bearing in mind the chemical industry capacity of States parties.

As we look forward to the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, the threat posed by nuclear weapons continues to loom large in our minds. The issue of a nuclear test ban and indeed nuclear disarmament remain priority items on our agenda. Nigeria has always expressed the view that the acquisition of nuclear weapons cannot guarantee genuine international peace and security. Thus, we have consistently called for urgent and concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation welcomes the decision by France to suspend nuclear weapons testing in 1992 and to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We also welcome the recent signing of the Protocol to the START Treaty in Lisbon by the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. However, we believe that unilateral and bilateral initiatives only complement multilateral efforts. The Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament has the responsibility of initiating negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

My delegation is disappointed that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has not been re-established due to lack of agreement on an appropriate mandate. We must not allow the golden opportunity provided by the recent initiatives on the reduction of nuclear arms to elude us. The post-cold-war era has created a favourable political environment for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate.

The world is in need of an effective international agreement that bans nuclear weapon testing in all environments for all time. The international community must take necessary measures to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test ban will be the first step in this direction. This would strengthen the present non-proliferation regime and ensure universal adherence.

The CD, reflecting the current changes in the international political system, decided recently to include a new item, "Transparency in armaments", in its agenda. My delegation fully supports this decision and will make its own contribution to the deliberations on this item. We believe that transparency and openness in armaments could enhance confidence-building among member States, thereby strengthening regional and international peace and security. However, the item has to be considered in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve its objectives. The production, stockpiling, accumulation and transfer of arms should all be given equal and adequate attention.

In conclusion, the Conference on Disarmament must confront its approved programme of work and adopt a more realistic, flexible and rewarding approach to accomplishing it. We must set our house in order by being responsive to the aspirations of mankind. We now have an unprecedented opportunity to advance towards the objectives of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, I must, at the outset, join you in welcoming Her Excellency the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, and express appreciation for the statement she has just made.

Today I should like to make a statement on behalf of the Western Group on agenda items 2 and 3. The Western Group welcomes discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament because we believe that such discussions play a positive role in strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age. It remains the view of the Western Group that the prevention of nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in the broader context of the prevention of war in general.

Peace and security can be achieved only through full observance of the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations and of other relevant obligations under international law. The maintenance and enhancement of

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

international security depend on responsible behaviour in relations between States. Such behaviour should strictly abide by the provisions contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, as well as other relevant obligations. However, the responsible conduct of States in maintaining international and national security requires more than just refraining from aggression. States should also demonstrate respect for international peace and security by engaging in measures of arms control, arms reduction and confidence-building.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, nuclear disarmament remains one of our highest priorities. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, all must be actively involved and contribute to measures of disarmament and arms limitation. It is a matter of necessity for all to make progress in this field.

Nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest threats to worldwide security and stability. The further proliferation of nuclear weapons would affect the security of all States. Thus, nuclear disarmament and the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear arms, particularly following the political changes of the last 12 months, represent one of the most serious challenges, and demand the attention and commitment of all members of the CD.

The last 18 months have seen some positive steps in the process of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. First, the satisfactory implementation of the INF Treaty, which achieved in 1991 the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons. This is an important factor of increased stability.

Second, the conclusion of the START Treaty and the subsequent initiatives of Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. We welcome the recent progress made by the United States and Russia towards further reductions in their nuclear arsenals and we wish to encourage efforts in this direction. We also welcome the recent signing in Lisbon of the protocol to the START Treaty signed by the United States, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia which will allow for the entry into force of the START Treaty.

Third, since the world situation has improved the United States is not building any nuclear weapons nor manufacturing plutonium or weapons-grade uranium for weapon production purposes for the first time since 1945.

Fourth, the unilateral decisions taken by the United States and the former USSR to eliminate all land-based short-range nuclear weapons. We express the hope that the implementation of these measures will take place in the best possible conditions of security and transparency. These initiatives should lead to further far-reaching steps in order to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible levels of forces.

Fifth, negotiations on defence and space issues, including the relationship between means of strategic offence and defence, have taken place between the United States and the former USSR. We strongly support the continuation of these negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

The other nuclear Powers who are members of the Western Group have also made meaningful contributions to the process of nuclear disarmament by making reductions in some of their nuclear weapon programmes.

We welcome recent initiatives in southern Africa, in particular the accession of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia to the NPT and the safeguards agreements with IAEA, as well as the moves towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its fifty-fourth ordinary session held in Abuja in May-June 1991.

We welcome major and positive initiatives in Latin America such as the "Mendoza Declaration", the "Cartagena Declaration", commitments entered into by Argentina and Brazil establishing full-scope safeguards regimes with IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, and the French decision to ratify Additional Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

With regard to the Korean peninsula, we welcome the entry into force of the safeguards agreement with IAEA by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and look forward to an early implementation of the agreement to allow IAEA to carry out fully its responsibilities on all nuclear facilities in the country as was announced by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We also encourage further development in the bilateral arrangements between North and South Korea regarding mutual inspections.

Each of these steps is a major contribution towards substantial reductions in the global level of nuclear weapons, leading on towards our shared, ultimate goal of global nuclear disarmament.

While the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament rests with those States which possess the most important arsenals, the international community as a whole must be actively involved and contribute to measures of nuclear disarmament and arms limitations and to non-proliferation. Our common wish is to see the achievement of further such substantial reductions and a reinforcement of existing barriers to nuclear weapon proliferation.

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to stability in the regions concerned, to non-proliferation, to the disarmament process in general as well as to international peace and security, provided all States concerned are prepared to cooperate on the basis of freely concluded agreements with appropriate verification measures and in conformity with internationally agreed principles.

We support efforts to make progress in disarmament in the Middle East. To this end we call on all States in the region to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In this context, we recall our support for the initiative of President Mubarak to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

The International Peace Conference on the Middle East offers interested parties the possibilities of a direct dialogue, which is also an appropriate manner of furthering disarmament in the Middle East. We reiterate our commitment to play a constructive and active role in those multilateral negotiations.

We reaffirm our strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in general, and the NPT in particular as a cornerstone of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation. We welcome the accession of more States to the NPT. With the accessions of France and China, all the permanent members of the Security Council will have become parties to the NPT, thus further strengthening the Treaty's universality. We urge again all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty.

We consider it essential that all new States of the former Soviet Union uphold their commitments. We reiterate the importance we attach to single control of nuclear weapons and to the effective control of nuclear exports from these republics. We expect that Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine will accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

We welcome the establishment of a Science and Technology Centre in Russia which will contribute both to disarmament and to non-proliferation objectives. Members of the Western Group have already made clear that they will extend substantial support to the Centre and others have indicated intentions to do so as well and look forward to cooperating with the other States involved to assure its success.

We consider that in parallel with wider adherence to the NPT, and in view of recent events, a further strengthening and improvement of safeguards implementation are desirable, as well as of nuclear export controls. We support proposals recently made to this end.

We welcome the progress made by IAEA in its efforts towards strengthening the Agency's safeguards systems. We hope that these efforts will be supported by all members.

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime are key instruments for the control of transfers of sensitive nuclear and missile materials, technology and equipment. We welcome recent decisions of the NSG to control exports of nuclear-related dual-use items and to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. We recognize the legitimate interest of the international community in the transfer of high technology for civil purposes and wish that discussion and cooperation will continue in this field.

It is important that this Conference continues to keep abreast of all disarmament initiatives and in particular encourages the process of nuclear disarmament. The Western Group welcomes recent progress and will continue to work towards the objective of achieving lasting international peace and security.

Mr. ALMUSAWI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to begin my statement by stating how pleased I am to have the honour of addressing you in this distinguished body. I wish you every success during your term as President of the Conference. May I at the same time state our great appreciation for the sincere efforts made in this forum to attain its noble objectives?

During the past few years, the life of the international community has been characterized by such interdependence that it has become necessary for all States to participate in the common endeavour of mankind in conformity with international law and without any dual interpretation of that law. The most pressing need is that of building a world in which war would no longer be a means of settling problems, a world where there would be no threat of annihilation, where peace, justice and equity would reign, as would criteria that would bring equality to all peoples and nations of our planet. Realization of this high objective must be brought about, inter alia, through the adoption of disarmament measures that are just and balanced and can safeguard the right of every State to security without any country or group of countries obtaining privileges at any stage. On the basis of this view, as contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, Iraq has participated in the work of the Conference on Disarmament as an observer since 1989, and it is drawing on that view that we have advocated expansion of the Conference on Disarmament to include all countries which so wish.

This year the work of the Conference on Disarmament is moving actively towards concluding a convention on a chemical weapons ban. While we appreciate most sincerely the efforts being carried out here to conclude the convention, we and many other peoples of the world hope to see a convention which will rid our planet of all chemical weapons without exception. The accession by all countries to this key convention, its objective and rigorous implementation and the non-inclusion of any measure that would impede scientific progress in developing countries or constitute a means of intervening in their domestic affairs are among the elements for its success. Furthermore, universal accession to the convention and its equal application to all countries, large or small, are exceptionally important to ensuring that no State party finds itself at the mercy of a State that is not party to the convention or another State party which fails to implement its terms.

Furthermore, despite the extreme importance attributed by the international community to a chemical weapons ban, this question should not be the sole focus of attention from this unique multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Progress should be made in other areas, particularly those falling within the competence of the ad hoc committees on nuclear weapons, given the maximum priority that the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly attributed to effective measures for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war.

(Mr. Almusawi, Iraq)

The decades that have passed since the establishment of this negotiating forum without effective measures having been taken on the items relating to nuclear disarmament are lost decades. However, hope remains that the ad hoc committees on nuclear weapons will be given appropriate mandates allowing them to embark on negotiations on halting the nuclear arms race, on a nuclear test ban, and on nuclear disarmament.

We welcome the bilateral efforts aimed at limiting certain categories of nuclear weapons, but they can never replace multilateral efforts in an area which is so important for the future of mankind as a whole. For this reason, bilateral and multilateral efforts should be complementary and should facilitate each other. The Conference on Disarmament must play an active role in this respect.

Although the majority of the world's countries attach importance to international efforts on nuclear disarmament, this is a matter of exceptional importance to our Arab region due to its inherent instability, which stems from Israel's possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, its occupation of the territories of more than one Arab State and its refusal to acknowledge the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost among these being its right to self-determination and to establish an independent State on its national soil.

Because of its refusal to accept foreign domination and hegemony, my country has for some time been the target of an unjust campaign which assumes various pretexts. The campaign reached its height in the use by the United States and its allies of armed force against my country on the pretext of implementing Security Council resolution 678 (1990). However, many facts have revealed that the true goal of the aggression against my country was to destroy its life and economic infrastructure. In this respect, I must quote Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who said in his report on his visit to Iraq from 10 to 17 March 1991 that the recent conflict had wrought near-apocalyptic results on the economic infrastructure of Iraq. In this brutal military aggression, the bombs dropped on my country were equivalent to seven of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima. The United States and the United Kingdom also used various weapons which are banned internationally, including depleted-uranium (U-238) bombs containing toxic chemicals and radioactive materials which threaten to cause large-scale human and environmental disaster.

Following this organized destruction of Iraq's basic infrastructure and the means of its civilian life, Security Council resolution 687 was adopted on 30 April 1992, under the title of the "cease-fire resolution". This resolution imposed measures and conditions on Iraq that are unprecedented in the history of this international organization. I will not dwell on the details of its provisions, which are not within the direct concern of this forum. I will, however, specifically address the measures provided for in

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section C of resolution 687, which deals with disarmament and verification procedures. You are no doubt aware that this section of the resolution in particular flagrantly employs double standards in dealing with the subject of arms in our region, since Iraq alone has been obliged to destroy the remainder of its non-conventional weapons, whereas other States in the region, notably Israel, continue to possess such weapons. The Security Council has overlooked the fact that Israel is the only State in the region which was asked by the Security Council in resolution 487 (1981) to place all its nuclear facilities under international control.

Iraq agreed to implement resolution 687 and today, one year after the implementation of that resolution, I think it useful to highlight in this Conference some of the lessons drawn from the implementation of the provisions of the resolution on weapons.

The Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have carried out 37 inspection missions involving nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, and Iraq has cooperated with the team of inspectors in the context of their mission, as stated in detail in the letter from the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council dated 23 January 1992, yet despite this, certain influential States in the Security Council, particularly the United States and Great Britain, continue to cast doubt on the position of Iraq. Obviously, there are many reasons for maintaining this atmosphere of suspicion, including the wish to justify the criminal acts perpetrated during the military operations against Iraq outside the framework of resolution 678, and the wish to use the suspicion as a pretext to maintain the economic blockade imposed on the Iraqi people and to benefit from the powers and immunities extended to the inspection team with a view to interfering in the domestic affairs of my country. I regret that I must state most bitterly in this forum that measures for arms limitation and verification have come to be used as a tool in the hands of the influential States for perpetuating their suspect policies, without the slightest regard for the principles that should govern the action of the United Nations, such as objectivity, neutrality, integrity, professionalism and scrupulous commitment to the provisions of the Charter and international law.

The Americans, for example, foisted the largest possible number of their inspectors onto the inspection teams; they accounted for more than 50 per cent of the members of some nuclear inspection teams. It is logical to believe that some of them did not come to carry out the mission entrusted to them by the United Nations, but rather to serve the political purposes of the United States. For instance, David Kay, an intelligence officer, was conveying the information gathered from Baghdad directly to Washington. On 30 October 1991, Mr. Ekéus himself conceded that Washington had received information from David Kay on Iraqi documentation before it was received by the United Nations. Here I should perhaps mention remarks published on 22 October 1991 in the French newspaper Libération which were made by a French expert who was a member of the United Nations inspection teams in

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Iraq. Referring to his American colleagues, he said that "they are apparently United States intelligence agents who are working for the CIA, and not for the United Nations". The French expert also stated that the American inspectors deliberately attempted to create confrontation with the Iraqi side, and even hoped that a mission member would die in order to justify United States intervention.

It was noted that some of the Special Commission inspection teams were intent on acquiring information and scientific, technical and administrative reports that bore no relationship to the mandate of the Special Commission or the resolutions of the Security Council, thus confirming that some members of the inspection teams were endeavouring to obtain intelligence information for their own countries for suspect political purposes of which everyone is now aware. Moreover, the fact that certain inspection teams entered sites that had nothing to do with the inspection, such as prisons, sports grounds and educational institutions, reflects the premeditated desire to provoke Iraq and thus create an artificial crisis. Some inspection teams also entered the headquarters of regional and international organizations in Iraq, disregarding the immunities extended to such premises.

Furthermore, overflights of Iraqi territory by United States U-2 spy-planes on the pretext of conducting aerial surveys for the Commission have recently reached an average of one overflight every 48 hours, lasting three to five hours, which clearly indicates that the primary beneficiary of the information and photographs collected by such aircraft is the United States and not the United Nations. It also indicates that the aircraft were originally used for American purposes which were continued through the United Nations.

The failure of the inspection team members to respect the confidential nature of the information gathered was such that on 5 December 1991, one such member, Mr. Leslie Thorn, extended invitations to an open lecture to be held in a restaurant at the United Nations offices in Vienna, where he was to talk about the tasks of the inspection teams in Iraq.

The examples I have cited are merely a drop in the ocean as far as the practices of some inspection team members are concerned; they reflect the methods used by certain influential countries to exploit the measures provided for under Security Council resolutions with respect to procedures for arms limitation and verification. These methods show one aspect of how these countries handle and interpret international measures. However, there is another aspect, no less excessive, which is that the campaign aimed at casting doubt on Iraq's position with respect to weapons and the artificial turmoil created by some inspection team members were exploited to obtain new Security Council resolutions containing more extremist provisions than those included in resolution 687; they now went beyond arms limitation to deprive our people of a free and dignified life and deny our country its industrial base.

(Mr. Almusawi, Iraq)

All the interpretations, allegations and concoctions with respect to the Iraqi arms programme are either false, fabricated or exaggerated. The Government of Iraq has already affirmed, and reaffirms, that Iraq has never sought to possess nuclear weapons and that its political leadership has at no time adopted a decision to channel research being carried out by the Iraqi scientists who specialize in nuclear energy towards the manufacture of any type of nuclear weapon.

While pointing out the serious and deliberate transgressions that took place under the cover of implementation of Security Council resolutions on arms limitation and the arbitrary action that accompanied their implementation, we hope that the lessons learned from this period will help to overcome the arbitrariness, narrow-minded self-interest and pre-set political goals which some States apply in implementing the international resolutions on weapons, irrespective of the forum in which such resolutions were adopted and irrespective of the mechanism for implementation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have heard the statement made by the representative of Iraq, and I am grateful to him for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I am sorry to take the floor again and I certainly do not want to waste the Conference's time by responding at length to the rubbish to which we have just listened. I really wonder, however, if this Conference has ever had to listen to such a catalogue of lies and hypocrisy.

At the beginning of the representative of Iraq's statement I was quite touched, almost moved to tears indeed, by the concern which he was showing for the people of the Middle East and for the stability of the area. And I agree with him that there are very special reasons why Iraq should be involved in any negotiations on chemical weapons. I might suggest to him that there are reasons other than the desire of the Western countries to perpetuate their hegemony over Iraq why it is that the Security Council has taken the measures it has taken against his country. The suggestion that the use of armed force against Iraq was on the pretext of anything is totally rejected by my delegation. It was to put an end to an unprovoked act of aggression against a small neighbouring State, and as far as my delegation is concerned we are proud of what we did.

I am also quite amazed to listen to what the Iraqi representative says about the effect on the environment of the actions of the coalition forces. I can only suggest that he should go to Kuwait and see the effect on the environment there of what has been done, which has been brought about by the action of the Iraqis, where they have turned the desert into sea, a sea of oil, and where for a while they turned day into night.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

I see absolutely no reason for the United Kingdom to have to cast doubt on the position of Iraq. It seems to me that there is no doubt and that the position of Iraq with regard to chemical and nuclear weapons is absolutely clear. It is a totally irresponsible attitude, and nothing which the Iraqi representative says will convince us otherwise. I would also reject the suggestion that the reason for the maintenance of the "blockade" against Iraq is anything but Iraq's failure to accept the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

I am sure we were all touched by his concern for the Iraqi people. It is surprising that there are any Iraqis left after the actions taken against them by his Government using any weapon to hand, including chemical weapons.

I am sorry to speak with such emotion, but frankly I cannot conceal my fury at the hypocrisy of the Iraqi representative and of his Government.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Let me support in every respect the statement just made by our distinguished colleague, the representative of the United Kingdom. We have all had to listen this morning to a self-serving, defensive and quite fanciful account of activities of representatives of the United Nations in carrying out decisions of the international community made with unprecedented unity of purpose. The allegations we have heard this morning are, of course, quite inappropriate for this forum. But since my country has been accused repeatedly by name, I am forced to take the floor to reject the accusations categorically. It is quite unnecessary to refute each one of these allegations because the activities and the findings of the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq are well known in this room. The work of the dedicated personnel of the inspection teams, what they found, the obstacles they have had to encounter and overcome are particularly well known, and the remarks of the representative of Iraq will be judged correctly for what they are by everyone in this room.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Mr. Breckon for his statement. The representative of Iraq has asked me for the floor once again. I would like to remind him that we are in a negotiating body and not a deliberative body and I would therefore be grateful in giving him the floor if he would be brief in his statement.

Mr. ALMUSAWI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): I will start with your remark, Mr. President, and say that I very much appreciate your view that we are in a negotiating forum where everone expresses his or her opinion and leaves it to others to draw their own conclusions.

I regret the words used by the representative of the United Kingdom and find them inappropriate to this negotiating forum. I see no reason for his surfeit of anger unless he really believes that his country and the coalition forces exceeded the mandate specified under resolution 687 and began systematically to destroy Iraq under the veil of international legitimacy. My statement merely spoke of the fear that arms limitation and control measures would come to be used as a weapon by certain States to interfere in the

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domestic affairs of other countries. I think this is one of the basic concerns preoccupying all delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and all those interested in the questions of international peace and security, transparency and so on. It was therefore logical for me to articulate our experience and he may articulate his own. However, I regret the words used and the allegations that Iraq used chemical weapons; I think this is a tune which is now well worn. He can tell me which forbidden weapons were used by the coalition forces against my country, against peace-lovers and against safe refuges. They include the depleted uranium to which I referred in my statement.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have taken note of your comments. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I would like to add my voice to what was said by the representative of the United Kingdom and by the representative of the United States. And in so far as, in an oblique manner, my country, in the shape of a French expert who was quoted on many occasions in a press cutting, was cited in the statements by the representative of Iraq, whose thrust was to extend to France what he said about the United Kingdom and the United States, with whom we feel complete solidarity, I would just like to say this. Extremely serious accusations have been made, as well as statements that are totally groundless in disregard of the most elementary respect for the actual facts. The first fact is the origin of the decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council, that is, Iraq's invasion of the sovereign State of Kuwait. The second fact, among others, is the violation by Iraq of its commitments vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency, a violation established and condemned by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 1991. Is there any need to remind you that all the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, starting with resolution 687, were adopted often unanimously, mostly with a very large majority, and were adopted in strict conformity with the responsibilities and rules of the supreme body of the international community - the same international community which, also by an overwhelming majority and repeatedly, has expressed its condemnation of Iraq's action?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no more speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? If not, the secretariat has, as usual, circulated today the timetable of meetings to be held during the coming week, in other words between 15 and 19 June. You will see that the timetable does not reflect meetings that may be held in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The activities of that subsidiary body are at present taking place in informal consultations, and so it is difficult to foresee the various meetings. That is why all that is indicated are the meetings the Committee will hold on Monday, 15 June at 5 p.m. and on 18 June at 3 p.m., and as you will see, a series of meetings on Monday morning, Tuesday morning and afternoon and Wednesday afternoon have been left open. In consultation with the secretariat I felt it would be

(The President)

appropriate to concentrate the other meetings of the Conference on Thursday and Friday as far as possible, in order to facilitate the meetings being held on the draft convention on chemical weapons, which must continue in their present form until Wednesday, 17 June. As always, the timetable is merely indicative and if necessary, we will amend it as circumstances dictate. If there are no objections I will take it that the Conference adopts this tentative timetable of meetings for the coming week.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As you will remember, during our last plenary we decided to cancel all tomorrow's meetings except for this plenary. Consequently, the informal meeting on the substance of item 2 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", which was to be held tomorrow, will be held, as the timetable indicates, after our plenary meeting on Thursday, 18 June.

I have no other items to take up, and so, unless any delegation wishes to speak, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.625
18 June 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 June 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Roberto García Moritán (Argentina)

GE.92-61884/4623B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 623rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, I should like to extend a cordial welcome in the Conference to His Exellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Doctor Ali Akbar Velayati, who will be our first speaker at this plenary meeting. The Minister has paid us frequent visits to set out his views on the items before the Conference. His presence today comes at a particularly important moment in our negotiations on the prohibition of all chemical weapons, an issue of top priority on our agenda on which he has specially focused in his statements at the Conference. We all know that he has had very good reasons to do so, as his country has been a victim of the use of those weapons of mass destruction. We are now very close to an agreement for which the Minister has worked since his first visit to the Conference on Disarmament on 16 February 1984. I am certain that we can count on his cooperation to successfully complete our negotiations, in which all the members of the Conference are playing a most active part.

In accordance with the timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting devoted to substantive issues under item 2 of our agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately following this plenary meeting.

On the list of speakers for today are His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the representatives of Spain, Egypt, Venezuela, Morocco and the Russian Federation. I now call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The security landscape of the world has continued to undergo unprecedented transformation since I addressed this Conference last time. The fundamental changes in the basic parameters of international relations today make the contemporary period one of great opportunity as well as considerable challenge. The second war in the Persian Gulf ushered in a new situation. It was only the second time in the history of the United Nations that the United Nations Security Council authorized military enforcement action. Unlike previous occasions, a sort of collective security mechanism entered into action, although not fully in the manner envisaged in the United Nations Charter, which ensures international supervision at all stages.

What are the lessons we can learn? Was this a unique event or will it become a model for the future? What will be the long-term consequences for the international community? This has been the subject of much debate, discussion and analysis. The overriding conclusion, at early stages, was that perhaps this exercise can become more institutionalized and be applied in similar circumstances. Time and events proved otherwise. In no other situation could the Security Council deal effectively with serious cases of crisis and tension. I am coming here from a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization where I witnessed much anguish and frustration as no decisive action has become possible at the international level in the face of grave violence against the Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

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discriminatory attitude of the Security Council vis-à-vis different crisis situations has severely tarnished its credibility and made it too unreliable for States to depend upon for threats against their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The two contradictory positions of the Security Council towards two similar, consecutive actions against Iran and Kuwait are far too vivid and too significant in their implications to ever be ignored or forgotten. Indeed, the Security Council, with its structural problems, is still too distant from a body that can safeguard international peace and security. It has also been realized, by now, that the second war in the Persian Gulf, successful as it was in reversing an aggression, did not solve the problems of our region and in certain cases magnified the security dilemma of a number of regional States. Outside interference is severely disturbing the fragile balance in the area. Huge amounts of sophisticated armaments dumped into this region in the last two years have been more a means of extending foreign influence than a source of security. The trend unfortunately continues unabated, directing much-needed resources to finance arms production by foreign Powers instead of the development of the region. Because of the geographic and demographic realities of the region, in a competitive scenario, smaller States tend to rely on external Powers and attempt to purchase security. The only solution is a security system which includes all countries of the region on the basis of cooperation rather than competition. Despite all odds, there are signs that the States of the region are now more prepared to follow this positive direction.

At the global level, the effects of the Persian Gulf war in the long term remain questionable. If the experience is to be used to promote the notion of leaving all decisions to the powerful, which to some extent has been the case, we are setting the stage for a more troubled world right from the start. If, on the other hand, we are to move towards more multilateralism, collectivity of purpose, commonality of security perceptions and concerted international action against all calamities and crises, then we can be more optimistic. The work of this Conference is thus far more significant now than in the past as an accelerated comprehensive approach towards disarmament with practical results contributes directly in putting the new trend in international relations on the right track.

It is unfortunate to witness that in the new international environment we are lagging behind developments. Actions speak louder than words. It is imperative that words be translated into deeds before they lose their credence. The bipolar system has come to an end but still the residual thoughts of outdated nuclear deterrence exist. Those doctrines nurturing such attitudes still form the basis of the strategic thinking of the big Powers. As a result, the nuclear questions at the Conference on Disarmament are almost dead. There seems to prevail a misperception that, with the end of the cold war, everything has been put in place. True, some steps have been taken. Agreements towards nuclear disarmament, including the new pledge of substantive cuts in nuclear arsenals, may be encouraging. Yet we no longer can, or should, look at what is removed, but what remains; and that which remains can still destroy the world many times over.

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It is incomprehensible that in the post-cold-war era, nuclear armaments should still exist at all. What are nuclear weapons for and who are they to deter? Against whom are they perceived to ever be employed? Is it still believed by some that nuclear arms are necessary to enhance the security of individual States or global security? Are nuclear arms considered to be political weapons or something that brings clout and prestige to its possessor? It is all too clear today that there remains no logic behind the possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons. If the momentum is not seized today we shall soon become habituated to the routine presence of nuclear arms on our planet and forced to accept it as a fact of life. There shall thus never be a world free of nuclear weapons. We cannot and must not allow that, as it will run counter to the most common and unified aspirations of the world community. In fact, our efforts should be mobilized so that the existence of nuclear weapons will not spill over to the next millennium. For this, we need agreements in three areas: a commitment by all nuclear-weapon States to destroy all nuclear weapons in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control by the year 2000; a renewed pledge by all States not to acquire and proliferate nuclear weapons or add to their existing stock; a genuine decision to allow enhanced technological cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. There is no reason for this ideal not to become reality if and only if the political will exists. In the meantime, the nuclear-weapon States must agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of these weapons. The accession of China and France to the NPT, a moratorium by certain Powers on 1992 testing, the rendering invalid of the old idea of nuclear deterrence, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Republics, further necessitate giving such assurances.

The successful conclusion of negotiations on a chemical weapons convention has emerged as a real possibility in 1992. The sense that this year will prove to be pivotal in the CWC negotiations has heightened global interest in the effort and stimulated anticipation of a positive result. We have been striving hard for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. There was, ironically, minimal international attention while our people were being victimized by these weapons and we had to endure severe military implications resulting from their use. Even under the most pressing circumstances we avoided any attempts to acquire these deadly weapons. There was hope that, at last, there would be concerted international action to stop the use of chemical weapons against us. That hope never became reality and the barbarbous weapons were used right through the last stages of the war. It is sad, therefore, to see that the convention approaches its fruition only at the cost of tens of thousands of innocent people. We welcome, nevertheless, that the convention is within reach this year provided that a reasonable balance is struck between the legitimate concerns of all negotiating parties. After eight years of war which caused unimaginable ruin and destruction, we need to devote all our energy and resources to reconstruction. For this any discriminatory restrictions with no relevance to the CWC may cause irreparable adverse effects on our industry and economy.

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But this is clearly not just our concern, as it has been evident that many developing countries share the same view. Article XI, in its final form should ensure access to technology while all restrictions parallel to the convention are removed. Developments in the field of industry should not be hampered, but rather promoted, for the betterment of mankind as the result of the convention. It should also be envisaged to compensate for any restrictions and intrusions imposed through verification procedures.

It is of paramount importance for any arms control and disarmament agreements to have a reliable verification system. There is going to be the first global international verification organization with direct and indirect implications for all aspects of the national life of States. The International Atomic Energy Agency was set up to regulate the peaceful use of nuclear power and does not verify nuclear disarmament in the sense of actual reduction of nuclear weapons. Moreover, no other disarmament treaty involves the control of a whole industry. Constraining widely available dual-use chemicals and technology with both civilian and military applications will be a daunting task. The provisions for verification under article VI should be aimed at confidence-building, while any suspicions of non-compliance should be dealt with under article IX, including challenge inspection. Efforts should be made to avoid a system of verification of chemical industry that may undermine confidence by creating an institutionalized level of suspicion. Excessive verification may possibly have counter-productive confidence-degrading results. There is no doubt, on the other hand, that the costs of verification of industry will be shifted onto prices and, therefore, affect the whole national economies of the developing countries which are the end-users of these chemicals. The indirect costs including security costs, regulation costs and spillage costs will also be borne mainly by the developing countries. Another important factor is the implementation of the convention. One may tend to focus rather too much on the negotiating process in Geneva and too little on what might follow. The trouble-free implementation of the CWC should not be taken for granted. History includes many examples of negotiated measures not being implemented as planned, or at all. In this context, a viable, cost-effective and non-discriminatory verification system turns out to be a determining factor for the future implementation of the CWC. The proposals tabled by 21 developing countries and China are aimed at securing this objective. This, along with other proposals by the G7 indeed present a compromise solution for most important issues that had remained unresolved. I hope to see that this initiative will continue to be studied seriously and considered constructively. Through this, we maintain our hope for the early conclusion of the convention. Efforts should be aimed at arriving at a consensus convention whose universality is guaranteed. In the meantime, it is of the utmost importance to prepare the ground for the entry into force of the convention. Nobody here seeks to conclude the convention this year and await its implementation for many long years as in the case of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. To that end it is imperative, in parallel with intensified negotiations, to work out arrangements to address security concerns of regions. So far as the Middle East countries are concerned, the biggest obstacle in the way of adherence to the CWC is the intransigent aggressiveness of Israel. It is universally acknowledged that Israel possesses undeclared nuclear weapons

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

and thus has an effective nuclear monopoly in the area. It is also common knowledge that Israel has the capability to launch biological and chemical warfare. It is, at the same time, party to neither the non-proliferation Treaty nor the 1972 biological weapons Convention. There must be adherence to the NPT and putting all Israeli nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as well as adherence to the BWC. Steps may then be followed to materialize the idea of a Middle East free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The question of regulating arms exports and imports is an old issue dating back to the League of Nations. Following the second war in the Persian Gulf, it has again been accorded high priority. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolution on transparency in armaments last year, for which the Islamic Republic of Iran cast its positive vote. We also welcome the inscription of the subject on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. This exercise since 1919 has not led to any tangible result due to the fact that all factors and elements have not been duly taken into account. The big Powers generally tend to ignore their determining role in thwarting the overarmament of the world. Four fifths of Iraqi weapons had been supplied by three of the permanent members of the Security Council. On the one hand the merits of scaling down arsenals are mentioned, and on the other military contracts worth billions of dollars are being signed. No discriminatory approach to this subject will last long. Transparency in armaments can indeed serve to enhance international security as well as the security of individual States as long as it remains devoid of any discrimination. In our view, in order to have a viable system of transparency in armaments, the following points should be heeded. First, the system should cover both conventional and non-conventional weapons. Second, the United Nations should play a crucial and neutral role in monitoring activities in this field. Third, the military and security agreements between big Powers and the developing countries should be transparent and verified. Fourth, the system should cover holdings and possession as well as transfers of weapons under the jurisdiction or control of any Member State. Fifth, all Member States should play their role in this monitoring system. It should not be monopolized by that handful of States which are more responsible for the present state of affairs. Sixth, monitoring should cover all regions of the world equally. Seventh, military-related technology and the transfer of such technology should be covered by the system. Eighth, the stock piling of weapons in other regions under the pretext of strategic reserves should be avoided. Ninth, foreign military bases or presence in different countries and the amount and type of weapons they possess should be included. In addition, in order to enhance confidence and to reduce threats within regions, it would be desirable to aim at regional arrangements whereby acquisition of arms will be made with prior notice, or perhaps approval, of others. Moreover, the notion that only a few exporting States decide about the security requirements of others and on that basis arrange their military scales will have counter-productive and damaging effects on the plausible idea of "more for butter than for guns". It should, therefore, be altogether avoided. In conclusion, let me wish you all success in discharging your weighty responsibilities at the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. PEREZ-VILLANUEVA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): It is almost superfluous to say that it is a source of singular satisfaction for me to take the floor in this room under your presidency, Sir, as you represent a country that is much loved by all Spaniards and especially myself. We have also had the opportunity over the past two years of establishing bonds of friendship with you, and noting in a very direct way your professional skills and your ability to discharge the duties of a Chairman at a time which is particularly difficult, particularly crucial and especially important for the work of this Assembly, which Spain views from the angle, I would venture to say if the formula existed, of a permanent observer.

I would not wish to forget to welcome the presence among us today of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, who has once again honoured us with his presence today. His visits are frequent, for which my delegation and my country are grateful to him. I had an opportunity to welcome him to Madrid a few years ago, and consequently I am pleased to note the interest he displays in visiting this Conference frequently.

Today, as I was saying, I will if I may briefly outline to this assembly a new experience carried out by Spain in an area that is still at the focus of interest in the negotiations on chemical weapons, and I will do so briefly because, I acknowledge, the Spanish experience is perhaps of greater interest at another time in the negotiations than it is today. However, I would like to stress that I am submitting it to this assembly on behalf of my Government with the conviction and in the belief that it might be useful at this point in time and properly demonstrate the interest of Spain, my country, in the convention on chemical weapons, firstly, and secondly might show that my country's commitment to the text of a future, and I hope immediate, convention on chemical weapons remains firm and resolute.

Almost a year ago, Spain had the honour of submitting to this Conference on Disarmament the results of a first trial inspection carried out in a chemical plant, following the procedure that was then taking shape for routine inspections. At the time I announced that, under the plan envisaged by my Government, a new trial inspection would be carried out in accordance with the terms and provisions laid down for challenge inspections. This inspection, moreover, would be carried out on an undeclared military facility. Accordingly, I now have pleasure, in keeping with the plan in force since then, in submitting to you, Sir, and the participants in this Conference the results of Spain's experience with a challenge inspection on an undeclared military facility, which are contained in a report that has been allocated the symbol CD/1152.

I should say from the outset that the task was not an easy one, and called for coordinated efforts on the part of various agencies, although for perhaps this very reason it has been very useful indeed as a source of enlightenment for my Government, the Spanish armed forces and my delegation. In order to make this as useful an exercise as possible, it was decided from the beginning not to spare any human or material resources, and to choose as complex a military facility as possible and one that would be appropriate for

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

a credible mock challenge involving a member of the future treaty on chemical weapons. The choice fell on a large multipurpose military base with a wide variety of buildings and facilities ranging from the simple storage of munitions to research in that area and the safekeeping of sensitive weapons. The detailed analysis of the phases and the most salient features of this inspection produced, as I have said, a great deal of information that is directly applicable to our own experience in this area, and to analysis of the practicablity of the provisions of the treaty, as we now know it and as it is now taking shape.

The following are some of the findings of the trial inspection. First of all, challenge inspection is both indispensable and also an instrument of last resort. No routine inspection by the permanent organization could ever resolve the well-founded and legitimate doubts that a member country of the treaty might have at a given point in time because of the attitude of another with regard to compliance with obligations entered into. But challenge inspection has to be an exercise of last resort, because of the inherent risks for the challenging country, which takes on a heavy responsibility vis-à-vis the international community in denouncing another State party which is already, in that capacity subject to other verification measures. In addition, the difficulties generated by an inspection of this type in practice confirm this status as a last resort.

Secondly, the time elapsing between notification of the challenge and the effective commencement of the inspection by a team sent by the organization must be as short as possible. Otherwise the inspection itself would become meaningless, a costly, gratuitously intrusive and ultimately futile exercise. It is difficult to accept, for example, at the end of the twentieth century, that for purely geographical reasons the time-frame for the transfer of inspectors from the point of entry to the actual facility to be inspected should have to be as long as we have heard proposed in our debates on occasion. The national security of the challenged State offers more justification for an extension of the time-frame, but even in that case there are instruments which in our experience make it possible to minimize the total amount of time that the inspectors would take to get down properly to their task.

Thirdly, the observer of the challenging State, who participated in this exercise raised definite difficulties. One observation at the outset: it is difficult to imagine an exceptional procedure like this one, triggered at the prompting of a member country, being carried out without the slightest participation of the latter. If the aim of the challenge inspection is to allay the legitimate fears of a country, logic dictates that it is essential for the observer to be present, as the representative of that country, who has to carry out a very strictly circumscribed function. This is precisely where the difficulty lies, in precisely defining those limits. The observer is indispensable, but if he is present to an "excessive" extent during the inspection this could distort its very purpose and could lead the inspected State to refuse to accept the team of inspectors.

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

In the Spanish experience the observer encouraged the activities of the team of inspectors, and observed their work, but did not control the conduct of the inspection. He was kept constantly informed, but his opinion was not decisive, nor, of course, did he cast a veto on any concrete action by the team of inspectors. A witness, yes, but not an inspector.

Fourthly, the system of managed access to the inspected facility proved particularly useful. Specifically, it helped greatly to alleviate the difficulties involved in determining the final perimeter - difficulties that seemed serious at first sight. In particular, and as an example, the random access for the team of inspectors to a number of large tunnels that have been dug out of the mountainside for storing gunpowder and sensitive material, which are equipped with "suspicious" systems of forced-draught and filtered ventilation, enabled them in this case to ascertain that the tunnels did not conceal anything that was contrary to the treaty. And this would also be possible in a real inspection. Even so, it is especially important to limit access to information obtained by the inspectors to a strict minimum number of persons and grades in the permanent organization. Important or unimportant information, on the staff or equipment of the inspected facility, maps, the exact geographical location, communications and so on. All this is the exclusive property of the inspected State and there seems to be no reason for this type of data to be publicized improperly.

Fifthly, challenge inspections are expensive. Spain easily quantified the direct costs of this type of exercise. The indirect costs are obviously more difficult to pin down, such as the man-hours of civil servants and military personnel which are therefore difficult to put into figures, but are undoubtedly worked, and must be taken into account. But these costs are part of the price that Spain is prepared to pay for the security provided by this type of inspection in the framework of an effective verification system under the provisions of the convention.

Spain rounded off this exercise with the conclusion that the pros far outweigh the cons, but it also had the opportunity to note something that I have already pointed out in the past, which has proved to be of particular importance: that challenge inspections must as far as possible be carried out with the active and wholly willing cooperation of the inspected State, which must have an interest in demonstrating full compliance with the provisions of the treaty.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Spain for his statement as well as the pleasant references he made to relations between our two countries and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Before calling on our next speaker, I should like to announce that the Chair has received news that one of our most distinguished colleagues, the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Dr. Rasaputram, is attending a plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament today for the last time as head of his country's delegation, and that regrettably he will not be able to be with us for the whole of the meeting this morning. For that reason, I should like to say on

(The President)

behalf of all of us that Ambassador Rasaputram's passage through the Conference on Disarmament has left a very clear imprint on the negotiations - both in guiding statements and in specific initiatives of relevance to the items before the Conference on Disarmament. On my own behalf I should like to add that the work of Dr. Rasaputram has also been particularly important in the sphere of the General Assembly, where for many years he coordinated the adoption of an important resolution in the area of the prevention of the arms race in outer space. I would like on behalf of all of us to extend our gratitude to Ambassador Rasaputram and Mrs. Rasaputram and wish them every success both professionally and personally. We are sure that in his future duties Ambassador Rasaputram will apply the same human skills and professional qualities as those we have seen in Geneva. I now give the floor to Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka.

Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, thank you for your kind words. First of all, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for this month. Having done such excellent work on outer space, you have shown professional abilities in conducting these sessions in the most able manner, and I am very pleased that you are presiding over the session on the last day I am in the CD. I have been here for three years. When I came I was practically in the seat just opposite the seat I am occupying today, so I have gone practically half the way round the square and, during this period, we have seen much progress. I remember the work done by Ambassador Hyltenius and Ambassador Batsanov in chemical weapons, culminating in the work that is being carried out today by Ambassador von Wagner, and in this particular area we are hoping that it will be a complete success before the end of this year. I remember once Ambassador Batsanov at a dinner party wanted a prediction as to when the chemical weapons convention could be completed. I think I did the prediction quite well when I said that it might be completed by the year 1992 - I think he has this prediction in his purse even now. I must also thank my colleagues for the excellent support and cooperation given to us during my stay here. I must also say that the secretariat, under the leadership of Ambassador Berasategui, gave me full assistance and cooperation during the term I was presiding over the session, for which I am really grateful. We are hopeful that all these matters regarding disarmament will come to the CD rather than being discussed outside the CD, thus the CD's importance will be enhanced in the future. Let me finally thank you, Sir, for giving me this time, interrupting this particular session and giving me this valuable time to make this very brief statement.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Ambassador of Sri Lanka for his statement, and we wish him every success. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Allow me at the outset, Mr. President, to welcome you again as President of the Conference on Disarmament during this crucial period of its deliberations. I wish you every success in your undertaking and am confident that your wisdom and experience will indeed enable you to succeed in discharging the task most admirably. As the end of your mission approaches as representative of Argentina, a friendly country with which Egypt has strong relations, I hope

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

you will allow me to express to you our sincerest appreciation and gratitude for the excellent and positive contributions you have made to the work of this Conference throughout your term as representative of Argentina to the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you success in your other high-level undertakings in your country.

I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Abdelhamid Semichi, the permanent representative of Algeria and its representative at the Conference on Disarmament, for the wisdom he displayed during his earlier presidency of the Conference. I learned only today that the mission and term in Geneva of Ambassador Rasaputram, the representative of Sri Lanka at the Conference on Disarmament, have almost ended and that he is about to assume other tasks. I would like to take this opportunity to express to him the sincere appreciation of the Egyptian delegation for all his positive proposals and splendid contributions on all the subjects covered at the Conference on Disarmament during his mission. I express to him the sincere appreciation of my delegation for his continued cooperation with us, which illustrates the excellent relations that exist between his country and Egypt, and wish him full success in the new post he is to take up in his country's service after leaving Geneva. It gives me pleasure to take this opportunity to welcome His Excellency Dr Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the occasion of his visit to this Conference, and to congratulate him on the valuable statement which he gave to the Conference today.

Both Ambassador Enahi, the permanent representative of India, and the representative of Kenya earlier expressed the views of 19 non-aligned States during the meeting of the Conference on 27 February 1992, in document CD/PV.612, concerning the second and third items on the agenda, namely Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and Prevention of nuclear war. The Egyptian delegation, however, wishes to add some relevant points as confirmation of its concern with these two important items which affect the peace and security of mankind. The interest of the Conference on Disarmament in the current negotiations on the draft convention on a chemical weapons ban, which are currently in their final stages, should not be to the detriment of our concern with the nuclear items. These nuclear items have been included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament as a reflection of the will of the international community to provide a suitable framework by regarding the Conference on Disarmament as the sole negotiating forum in the United Nations to deal with questions of disarmament. Nuclear weapons are considered to be the most dangerous weapons to threaten the peace and security of all mankind. To that effect, General Assembly resolution 1653 of 1961 stated that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the laws of humanity and constitutes a crime against civilization. As long as nuclear weapons remain a threat it is the responsibility of this Conference to expose, confront and suppress this danger. This is the genesis of items 2 and 3. We wish to put on record our regret that the Conference has so far been unable to establish ad hoc committees for these two items notwithstanding the submission of a draft mandate on item 2 by the Group of 21 on 27 July 1989, contained in document CD/819/Rev.1, and of a further draft mandate on establishing a committee on item 3, contained in document CD/515/Rev.5.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt

The international community has, over the past years, taken solid steps towards the objectives and purposes of nuclear disarmament. Primarily, we wish to welcome the concrete measures adopted and the positive agreements concluded during this period; they are undoubtedly steps in the right direction. Among these achievements is the signing of the INF Treaty, followed by the START agreement, in which Washington and Moscow pledged substantial reductions in long-range strategic nuclear missiles and intercontinental missiles. This was followed by further positive measures in September 1991 undertaken by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, and last but not least, the recent agreement between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in Washington to make further significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries, particularly multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic and other nuclear missiles, by the year 2003. We hope to obtain additional information on this agreement so that it can be taken into account in our deliberations at this Conference. We also hope that similar steps will be taken by the other nuclear States in order to produce what can be described as "an impending race to disarm as opposed to an arms race".

I have mentioned this on previous occasions on behalf of Egypt, particularly in the discussions in the First Committee during the forty-seventh General Assembly. These steps have created a propitious international climate and have helped to improve mutual trust-building and diminished for the first time in a long while the risk of nuclear war breaking out. This spurred NATO, on 17 October 1991, to dismantle 700 nuclear warheads and to destroy 50 per cent of the nuclear warheads stockpiled in Europe.

These measures have extended to another field, namely conventional weapons in Europe, and I refer specifically to the Paris Charter which contains important provisions that will take European security into new horizons. We have followed the changes which have altered the political map of what was known as the Soviet Union and seen the emergence of the new Commonwealth of independent republics. The question now is: as we approach the twenty-first century, does the world of today need the huge quantities of nuclear weapons which remain stockpiled? What is the point of the policy of nuclear deterrence still upheld by some nuclear States while we are taking unremitting steps towards collective security? If we speak of nuclear deterrence, against whom is it needed? This leads to another question on the usefulness of continuing nuclear testing with the aim of developing advanced modern generations of nuclear weapons, or of testing their suitability for use. International peace and security cannot be realized through stockpiling nuclear weapons. The maintenance of international peace and security is not based on a fragile balance of deterrent capacity and strategic balance. In fact, genuine peace can only exist in a world where cohesion and cooperation reigns among nations.

The Earth Summit which concluded its work a few days ago in Rio de Janeir demonstrated that the international agenda is fraught with new problems which, if not solved, will destroy the natural balance and the future of all mankind. We are therefore calling for the enormous cost and the available financial and human resources which are still devoted to armament to be mobilized for economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries,

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which are in dire need of finance. In this respect, we hope to reach agreement on a system banning the transfer and export of conventional arms to countries around the world as a preliminary step towards the major Powers setting an example in the reduction of military expenditure and operating on the basis of a security system with minimum levels of armament. This is an example that should be followed by all other countries, particularly the developing ones.

The recent arms control agreements must not decrease our enthusiasm or slow down our efforts to deal with disarmament and arms control issues. We are consequently calling for a more active role for the United Nations in the field of disarmament, especially in the nuclear field, and for a halt to all nuclear tests, including those conducted underground. Such tests contribute to vertical proliferation and qualitative development, especially after the NPT has dealt with preventing horizontal proliferation.

Egypt has advocated the vital importance of an active role for the United Nations in establishing demilitarized zones around the world. In the proper context of the General Assembly of the United Nations and in conjuction with Iran, Egypt presented an initiative in 1974 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. This initiative has enjoyed consensus in the successive sessions of the General Assembly since 1980. I am concerned to refer particularly to the resolution passed at the forty-fifth session on a report from the Secretary-General containing a study by a group of experts on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of such a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (document A/45/435 dated 10 October 1990). Moreover, on 8 April 1990, President Hosny Mubarak presented an initiative whereby the region of the Middle East would be declared an area free of all weapons of mass destruction and emphasized the following: first, the banning of all weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - from the Middle East without exception. Second, all countries in the region without exception should make reciprocal simultaneous commitments in this regard. Third, the establishment and application of effective verification measures to ascertain full compliance without exception by all countries in the region with the comprehensive framework of this ban.

I listened with great interest and appreciation to the support of the Western Group as expressed by Sir Michael Weston, Ambassador of the United Kingdom, on 10 June 1992 - last week - for President Mubarak's initiative to declare the Middle East an area free of all weapons of mass destruction, and wish to express my delegation's satisfaction at that support. I would like to see international efforts united in realizing the objectives of the Egyptian proposal aimed primarily at avoiding risk and tension in the Middle East, thus paving the way for mutual confidence, Egypt having realized the danger confronting the area due to the accumulation of such arms. This proposal reflects once more Egypt's wish to contribute in presenting practical and constructive solutions to counter any future threat to the area.

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Based on these premises, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Amre Moussa, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (document A/46/329 and Security Council document S/22855) regarding Egypt's position on the initiatives for arms control and disarmament. In the letter, he highlighted ideas held by Egypt on enhancing the security of the Middle East countries through the lowest level of armament and a qualitative and quantitative balance between the military capabilities of all States in the region. The continuation of the present qualitative and quantitative inequality between the military capabilities of the countries in the region is a matter that should not be allowed to continue in an area stricken by tension. On these grounds, Egypt supports the current peace process in the Middle East which was launched at the Madrid Conference in October 1991, a process directed towards establishing a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict so as to ensure security in the area and provide prosperity and development for all of its peoples.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement as well as for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Arteaga.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it is a source of special satisfaction for the delegation of Venezuela to see you, my very distinguished friend, presiding over the work of the Conference. We have followed closely, and with admiration, your outstanding career as an Argentine diplomat committed to the loftiest Latin American causes, and we certainly appreciate the valuable contribution that you have made and are making to efforts towards disarmament in this and other forums, so please be assured of our full cooperation in the same spirit of cooperation that has always characterized relations between our countries, Argentina and Venezuela. We should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Semichi of Algeria for his performance as President of the Conference in the previous term. We also endorse the words with which you so aptly expressed feelings of regret on behalf of the Conference at the departure of Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, to whom we wish every success.

In the statement I am going to make, I should like to refer very briefly to the question of chemical weapons. The Conference on Disarmament is moving towards the conclusion of work relating to the draft convention on the prohibition of these weapons. At this time we must strive to resolve rapidly the problems still outstanding in these negotiations, namely the issues of challenge inspection, verification, the composition of the executive council, economic and technological development, old and abandoned chemical weapons and financial aspects of the organization. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee has been unstinting in his persistent efforts. He has provided us with a restructured text of the draft convention which has enjoyed our careful

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

Verification is one of the central pillars of the future convention. It is in everyone's interest that this system should be as effective as possible. Effective does not necessarily mean excessively costly. We should achieve a balanced cost-effectiveness ratio through the system to be adopted. Otherwise we would run the risk of creating very complex machinery which might lead to an excessive and even unnecessary number of inspections and a heavy financial burden which developing countries would find it hard to shoulder. The issue at hand, rather, is to create a system designed, through its various aspects, to ensure the effective application of the convention, including its persuasive nature, and to verify those activities that can really be considered as being in breach of the convention, or capable of being steered in that direction.

But the convention should guarantee and respect the right of developing countries to chemical industry development for peaceful purposes. Concrete provisions on economic and technological development and international cooperation in the peaceful applications of chemical activities have been included in the draft convention. We hope that the problems outstanding in these negotiations will soon be solved. We reiterate the need to adopt a system designed to ensure the unlimited peaceful development thereof.

In respect of the question of costs, the delegation of Venezuela supports the inclusion in the draft convention of clear provisions on the responsibility devolving upon countries possessing chemical weapons to cover the costs relating to the destruction of their stockpiles and production facilities, as well as their verification, without losing sight, of course, of existing bilateral agreements on this subject. We understand that the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons should play a role in this context, but it should also be clear that there are many countries that have not produced such weapons.

Equitable representation of all parties is an essential element which should characterize the composition of the future decision-making body of the convention, the executive council. We express our gratitude to the Ambassador of Hungary, Tibor Tóth, for the efforts he is making to find a common formula. Because of the particular character of the future convention, the "industrial" element can hardly be discarded. None the less, we believe that this is not the fundamental principle. It is necessary to seek a proper balance between the latter and a fair equitable geographical representation on the Council.

We wish to express, as the official position of the Government of Venezuela, our support for The Hague as the headquarters of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Little time is left to us. Let us avail ourselves of this opportunity to respond decisively to the expectations of the international community. Let us

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement, as well as for the very kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, I would like first of all to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation following your accession to the post of President of the Conference, whose functions you are discharging with your well-known skill. The active role that you have played for many years in enriching our thinking and your wide diplomatic skill guarantee success in the performance of the task that you are taking up. To your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, my delegation expresses its gratitude for the dedication, accessibility and open-mindedness that he showed during the preceding term.

As I am taking the floor for the first time since their arrival, I would like to welcome Ambassadors Tanaka of Japan and Weston of the United Kingdom. I would also like to express on behalf of my delegation our satisfaction at seeing Ambassador Berasategui carrying out the functions of Secretary-General of our Conference, and we would like to congratulate him most warmly for his appointment and wish him every success in his lofty tasks. Lastly, my delegation welcomes the presence of Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and wishes Ambassador Vaezgourmam who is coming to the end of his assignment in Geneva, every success in his new functions.

While it is appropriate to welcome the decisions taken recently by the major Powers concerning the dismantling of the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction that have threatened the planet for many years, the absence of any progress in disarmament at the multilateral level jeopardizes the credibility of the Conference. In the past, the confrontation between Blocs might have justified the deadlock that marked our work. But changes of historic scope have occurred; they have significantly changed the international political situation and thus have created conditions for the Conference that could lead to substantial breakthroughs.

In this context, which is favourable to a stepping up of our work, we would like to emphasize the need to strengthen the role of the Conference, whose effectiveness depends on its capacity to negotiate disarmament agreements in all areas of its mandate. At this stage I would like to quote His Majesty King Hassan II, who, speaking at the Security Council summit last January, stated that the strengthening of the United Nations and the enhancement of its role in maintaining international peace and security required the international community to address disarmament matters seriously. An enhanced awareness of this priority and a more determined political will to deal with it could strengthen our hopes that the series of

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In this context, my delegation shares the view that the cornerstone of the future convention should be an adequate system for verification of compliance with the obligations arising out of the treaty. Only a system that is strict but at the same time free of abuses could create confidence among States parties when inspections are being carried out. Inspection procedures must scrupulously respect the objectives and purpose of the treaty. They cannot in any way be used for partisan purposes beyond the limits specified in the convention. Nevertheless, in order to guarantee the credibility of such operations, the bodies entrusted with inspection should have the necessary capabilities that will enable them to make a proper evaluation of compliance with the terms of the treaty. In other words, verification operations in their diverse forms should not lead to any misunderstanding that would be prejudicial to one or other of the parties involved.

These are the principles which we think should be taken into consideration for the success of the difficult negotiations dealing with verification. In the final analysis, my delegation considers that a climate of confidence and cooperation should prevail in the conduct of verification operations, and in our view this should come to the forefront in the texts and articles concerning this aspect of the treaty.

The banning of chemical weapons should not lead to the placing of obstacles along the path of the development of research and the expansion of production in civilian chemical industries for peaceful purposes of development and cooperation. My delegation considers that this is a vital issue in the negotiations, and we hope, moreover, that the entry into force of the future treaty will constitute a qualitative step forward in this area and that all obstacles will be removed in order to build up true confidence among the parties. We also see in this the most appropriate means of ensuring the universality of the treaty.

Likewise, the executive council will have a task that is no less important. Consequently, its membership should reflect the necessary balance among the various parts of the world. From this point of view, geographical criteria should be preponderant in the allocation of seats. Nor can we ignore the presence of parties with specific interests, such as those with developed chemical industries. Nevertheless, my delegation would like to underscore the special interest it attaches to the principle of rotation, which should ensure that everyone has an opportunity to sit on the Council.

My delegation wishes to congratulate Ambassador von Wagner, who is making major efforts to ensure the success of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. His open-mindedness and the commitment to compromise which inspires him will, we are convinced, help overcome the difficulties that still exist. We would also

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have a positive impact on the establishment of the machinery whose task it will be to ensure the application of the convention. We would therefore like to thank the delegations of Finland, Germany and the Netherlands that are carrying out such a necessary task.

I have an opportunity today to confirm on behalf of my Government that Morocco does not possess any chemical weapons and has no intention of producing or acquiring any. In addition, my Delegation intends to become an original party to the future convention.

No one can question the great importance of nuclear disarmament and the consequent obligations falling on our Conference. The work dealing with chemical weapons should not lessen our determination to make progress on this issue of vital importance for the future of mankind. The time has come to better organize our endeavour to make the Conference on Disarmament play a more active role as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. The developments in international relations, however encouraging they are, require us to be vigilant because the risk remains that the process might go awry or that there might be a confrontation, and it is our responsibility to stimulate further efforts at the multilateral level. In this connection, my Delegation wishes to draw attention to the crucial importance of a complete ban on nuclear tests. The work carried out by our Conference on this issue, despite its limited nature, has shown the priority that should be given to a ban on such tests. Their continuation gives further impetus to the nuclear arms race, in both its quantitative and its qualitative aspects. A treaty completely banning nuclear tests is therefore essential to the goal of genuine, verified nuclear disarmament. Important statements were made on this matter during the first part of the current session of the Conference. We welcome in particular those made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia and Germany, who called for the negotiation of a treaty in this area. Likewise, the announcement made recently by the French Government that it was suspending its tests in the Pacific will promote the objectives pursued by the Conference and should be welcomed. All these steps offer the Conference on Disarmament an historic opportunity that it must grasp in order to embark on genuine negotiations on what has now become a priority issue, because the threat of nuclear proliferation will persist in the absence of concrete results in this area of decisive significance for international security.

Because of their scale, issues related to nuclear weapons constitute a challenge that goes beyond the real or alleged security needs in a given region or between different powers. The clearly understood interest of the international community as a whole urges us to remove all risks of nuclear confrontation by controlling the factors promoting proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, on the understanding that the principle of the complete banning of this type of weapon will remain the final objective in

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

our efforts in order to make nuclear disarmament irreversible, and the Conference on Disarmament as the multilateral body with a mandate in this area must participate effectively in this action by setting up the necessary machinery which will enable it to work for the achievement of the progress expected of it by the international community.

We note with bitterness the absence of progress on a large part of the Conference's agenda, despite the numerous relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly urging the commencement of appropriate international negotiations to give disarmament specific content. The procedural steps taken by the Conference on the questions concerning outer space, radiological weapons or negative security assurances have not achieved their goal - the conclusion of international agreements of a universal character in all these areas. This legal vacuum combined with the dazzling scientific and technological innovations in these sectors suggest that preventive measures are urgently necessary to fill these gaps. This is where our most decisive task lies for the future of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to express profound satisfaction at seeing you in the post of leader of our work. You have long since proved yourself as one of our most experienced colleagues who is thoroughly conversant with all the subtleties of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and that is perhaps one of the explanations for your brilliant success in guiding our work now while combining this duty with extremely active work at the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Of course, I wish you every success in future as well. I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Seeichi, who performed the duties of President of the Conference and did so very successfully in the last working month.

It gives me special pleasure today to take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Russia and the United States to announce that President Yeltsin and President Bush concluded an important agreement yesterday in Washington in two areas of vital importance to both our countries and the whole world. This agreement will lead to a further reduction in our nuclear arsenals to well below the totals agreed to only last summer in the START Treaty. The total number of strategic nuclear weapons for both sides will be reduced from 21,000 to 6-7,000. This target will be accomplished in two phases. Under the first phase, deployed warheads for each side will be reduced to between 3,800 and 4,250. In the second phase, the total number of strategic nuclear weapons for each side will drop down to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads.

(Mr. Batsanov, Russian Federation)

requirements. The second phase will be completed no later than the year 2003, and may be completed as early as the year 2000 if the United States can assist Russia in the required destruction of ballistic missile systems.

Thus, within five months it has become possible to agree on much more significant reductions than those agreed upon after 15 years of START negotiations. In the near future, Russia and the United States will formalize the agreement in a brief treaty document that will be signed by the Presidents of both countries and submitted for ratification in the two countries.

The two Presidents also agreed to work together along with other interested States to develop a concept for global protection against limited nuclear missile attack. A senior group will be established to explore practical steps towards that end, including such areas as early warning and cooperation in developing ballistic missile defence capabilities and technologies. This group will also explore the development of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaty agreements, and possible changes to existing treaties and agreements. The senior group will hold its first meeting in Moscow within the next 30 days.

The prohibition of chemical weapons was another important subject discussed at the summit. The discussion resulted in a joint statement on chemical weapons, the text of which I shall read in English, since the final version of the Russian text is not available to us yet.

(continued in English)

"President Bush and President Yeltsin stressed their continuing commitment to the global elimination of chemical weapons. They expressed their conviction that the Geneva negotiations on a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons can be concluded by the end of August. They agreed to instruct their representatives accordingly, and called on all participants in the negotiations to do their utmost to achieve this goal. They expressed the hope that a ministerial meeting could be convened in that time-frame to approve the convention.

"The two leaders underscored their support for the 1989 Wyoming Joint Memorandum on phased confidence-building measures in the area of chemical weapons destruction, and agreed to implement the new, cooperative provisions for detailed data exchanges and inspections included in the Joint Memorandum as soon as arrangements can be completed. They also agreed that the June 1990 bilateral chemical weapons destruction agreement would be updated and brought into force promptly."

(continued in Russian)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the [illegible] of the Russian Federation for his statement as well as the kind words he addressed to me. I have no further speakers on my list for today. I recognize the United States delegation and I call on the distinguished Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Prior to his statement just concluded on arms control results of the Russian-American summit, Ambassador Batsanov spoke also on my behalf of our high regard for you, Mr. President, and for your predecessor, Ambassador Semichi.

I have a brief statement to make, on instruction from my authorities in Washington, concerning the issue of Yugoslavia's status in the Conference on Disarmament. We call your attention to Security Council resolution 757 of 30 May 1992, which noted: "The claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted". The United States firmly believes that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer exists. Furthermore, we do not consider Serbia Montenegro to be the continuation of, or sole successor to, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the position of the United States is that Serbia Montenegro is not entitled to assume the seat of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international organizations, including the Conference on Disarmament. The United States also believes that this issue needs to be resolved first in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and that the Conference on Disarmament should be guided by their disposition of the issue.

Mr. KEYTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Since the distinguished Ambassador of the United States has spoken on the subject of Yugoslavia, I wish to recall the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium on 14 May on behalf of certain Western delegations, including my own. I wish to state that the position of my delegation remains as set out in that statement.

Mr. DIMITRIJEVIC (Yugoslavia): Since I am taking the floor for the first time in this august body, allow me, Mr. President, to express to you the sincere congratulations of my delegation, and to extend to you our full support in the exercise of your important duty. We are proud to have in you such a good and knowledgeable friend. My congratulations and support are equally addressed to the Secretary-General of our Conference, His Excellency Ambassador Berasategui, known as an outstanding diplomat of friendly democratic Argentina.

The statement of His Excellency Mr. Velayati, the Foreign Minister of Iran, whom we welcome in our Conference, reminded me of the old saying

(Mr. Dimitrijevic, Yugoslavia)

wrong perception of historic and political interests of one's own people. But there is no link whatsoever between events there and those which took place in the time of the Gulf crisis. Every better-educated student of international relations and of international law can tell that to His Excellency Mr. Velayati. I suggest to my colleagues from the delegation of Iran, with whom my delegation and I maintain very friendly relations, to seek proper advice from their experts in international law and international relations. We, on our part, are ready to extend that expertise as well. I do apologise to you, Mr. President, to the distinguished Ambassadors and to my colleagues, since in this august body the Conference on Disarmament, only the words of wisdom and the will to contribute to the elimination of the sources of confrontations in the world should be addressed and heard. We have another saying: "When one's roof is in flames, do not add to the trouble." Precisely because of those convictions, I decided to depart from our agenda since His Excellency Mr. Velayati had made that choice himself. Allow me to conclude with very warm support and welcome for the extraordinary agreement between the Presidents of the United States and democratic Russia. This is to be seen as a new source of inspiration for the successful outcome of our efforts in this Conference, particularly with regard to the speedy conclusion of the convention on the chemical weapons ban.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no more speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): I will be very brief, Mr. President, you will recall that last Monday Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, in his capacity as a friend of the Chair, had informal consultations with the individual heads of delegations on the outstanding issue of the future headquarters of the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to thank him for his tremendous efforts in carrying out this delicate assignment. Another consultation has been scheduled for tomorrow, Friday, in which my delegation will participate. We have no doubt that the positive work achieved so far will bring about consensus choice. At this stage, Mr. President, I wish to announce that I have been instructed by my Government, Nigeria, to support the Dutch offer to host the future headquarters of the organization in The Hague.

Mr. TABATABAEE (Islamic Republic of Iran): Since issues were raised vis-à-vis the statement made by my Minister, I wish to mention a few points. Mr. Velayati's speech was mainly an effort to contribute to our negotiations on the CWC. We thought that almost everyone present here had noticed that the lecture was, for this purpose, very technically oriented, and I only wish to register my delegation's surprise at the political interpretation of that lecture. We wish to request delegations to read the text which was distributed more carefully.

(The President)

President offers is that of imposing a closing statement on delegations attending the plenary, and I will try to do so with a minimum of frills. The end of a term of office that has been so short and also so busy, thanks to the tireless efficiency of the secretariat, does not, however, seem to lend itself to substantial or excessively profound reflections about the events of the past four weeks. After all, no historical cycle has been completed in these weeks and there have been no dramatic changes in the international situation, for better or for worse. Yet I would like to highlight briefly certain facts that I think have been of interest in this very special period of time for the Conference, as seen from the particular vantage point of this podium.

(The President)

have to put some order in our work and make headway in those areas where conceptual clarity is greater so that a start can be made on pre-negotiating work, subsequently moving on to broach other subjects. I also think that in 1993, as I said in my opening statement, the Conference on Disarmament should give satisfaction to those States which are not members of the Conference and which for a long time now have been waiting for the honouring of a commitment that all of us assumed quite some time ago, which is the enlargement of our body. To my mind the Conference should give a very clear and prompt indication on this matter, and perhaps we should all give some thought to the desirability of giving a clear indication in our report to the General Assembly this year.

Four weeks ago I said that serving as President involved, inter alia, much to do with chance and administrative routine. There is nothing wrong with that. Indeed, sometimes leaving things to chance gives good results. As from the next plenary meeting your work will be guided by the Australian delegation through our friend Ambassador Peter O'Sullivan. It would really be a good idea to await the fruit of chance. If the Conference on Disarmament entrusted the responsibility of chairing certain posts for the presidency of a country which, like Australia, has participated so much in these negotiations and which has, therefore, transformed the psychological atmosphere in these negotiations in the space of one plenary meeting, I agreed by most sincere hopes that this will happen. For my part, on my behalf and on behalf of my delegation, I would like to thank you all for having facilitated my work. To the Secretary-General and his staff for efficient team of assistants, as always, the thanks of the Argentine delegation. I leave this podium and return to my seat.

The secretariat has distributed today the timetable of meetings that the Conference and its subsidiary bodies will hold during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies; it is merely indicative and can be amended if necessary. In that regard, I would like to inform you that there are no speakers on the list for the next plenary meeting. In consultation with the incoming President, Ambassador O'Sullivan, we have agreed to recommend to the Conference that if there are no delegations that have put their names down before tomorrow, Friday, at 5 p.m., Tuesday's plenary meeting will be automatically cancelled and the Conference will hold only the informal meeting that is indicated in the timetable under the item entitled "Transparency in armaments". On this understanding, and if there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference approves the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call on the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): I apologize

(Mr. Batsanov, Russian Federation)

circulated previously, but I have only just noticed it. Next to the entry for the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we have asterisks everywhere in this timetable of meetings indicating that these will be meetings with interpretation. We all know that there are many meetings within the chemical weapons negotiations that now take place without interpretation. However, when these meetings are set alongside meetings of other ad hoc committees, the question might arise of whether the other meetings have interpretation or not. But again we all know the reply, and I am not asking for a clarification on this point; we simply do not understand whether this asterisk refers to this particular case.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and especially for his powers of observation. The asterisks had been placed here because in the past, as you will know, there have been relatively modest number of meetings of the CW Committee without interpretation, and this is merely a way of highlighting that those meetings in the CW Committee will all have interpretation, just like all the other meetings appearing on the timetable for the week 20-24 June. I do thank ambassador Batsanov for his powers of observation, because I think this was a good opportunity to solve the problem.

As I announced at the outset of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting to substantive issues under agenda item 5. I have no further business, and I will consequently adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday next, possibly meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 22 June, if there are speakers on the list. If not, the plenary meeting will take place on Thursday, 24 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.